

Edgar Snow on Lin Yutang

THE *Nation*

February 17, 1945

Daybreak at Yalta

More Perfect Union *An Editorial*

This Is What We Voted For *I. F. Stone*

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Labor Meets in London

A CABLE FROM MARGARET STEWART

✱

The Battle of the Rhone

BY ANDREE VIOLLIS

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
The Nazis' Next Twelve Years

BY HORST MENDERSHAUSEN

Helping the sick get well



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Published weekly

Vol. 29, No. 1

March 13, 1957

March 8, 1957

THE *Nation*

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 160

NEW YORK • SATURDAY • FEBRUARY 17, 1945

NUMBER 7

IN THIS ISSUE

EDITORIALS

- More Perfect Union 169
- The Shape of Things 170
- Wanted: a Janitor 172
- Enter the Air Trust 172

ARTICLES

- The War Fronts *by Charles G. Bolté* 173
- This Is What We Voted for *by I. F. Stone* 174
- Labor Meets in London *by Margaret Stewart* 176
- Reports: Britain's Triple-A Priority *by Keith Hutchison* 177
- The Battle of the Rhone *by Andréa Viollis* 179
- China to Lin Yutang *by Edgar Snow* 180
- In the Wind 183

POLITICAL WAR

- The Nazis' Next Twelve Years *by Horst Mendershausen* 184

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

- Notes by the Way *by Margaret Marshall* 187
- Concerning the Devil *by Reinhold Niebuhr* 188
- Briefer Comment 189
- Films *by James Agee* 192
- Art *by Clement Greenberg* 193
- Music *by B. H. Haggin* 194

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

- CROSS WORD PUZZLE NO. 103 *by Jack Barrett* 196

More Perfect Union

THE long-awaited meeting of the Big Three has more than justified expectations. After the Crimea Conference any lingering hopes our enemies may have entertained of dissension and division among the leading powers of the United Nations, must be dashed. Whatever disagreements existed among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, it is clear that a common determination utterly to crush Nazism proved a cement far more powerful than any of the forces pulling them apart. And whatever questions were left unresolved, they certainly managed to dispose with amity of a long and controversial agenda.

The communiqué issued jointly at the close of the conference is a most impressive list of achievements. As was to be expected, the coordination of plans for the final military defeat of Germany takes pride of place, and for the better realization of that aim there is, at last, provision for meetings of the general staffs of all three countries. Even more useful at this stage of the war, when political problems are coming more and more to the front, is the arrangement for regular and frequent consultations of the foreign secretaries of the three powers. Another welcome feature of the communiqué is its very specific reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, together with proposals for dealing with the problems of the liberated countries in the spirit of that instrument. Added to this is a solution for the tangled and embittered Polish question—a solution which obviously represents a compromise and one which we hope will receive sufficient support from the Poles themselves to prove workable.

A noteworthy product of the discussions is the olive branch held out to France. The French felt, with reason, that they were entitled to an invitation to the conference, which was bound to have an important bearing on their future security. Now they are asked to participate both in the occupation and the control of Germany. Further, France, together with China, is asked to join in sponsoring the United Nations conference on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which will be held in April, and is to be consulted on the solution reached for the voting-procedure difficulty before this is made public. Finally, the French government is being invited to help operate the machinery designed to facilitate concerted action in ironing out the internal political and economic difficulties of the liberated countries.

In regard to Germany, the Big Three "agreed on common plans and policies for enforcing the unconditional-surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany." These terms are not to be published until the defeat of Germany, but it is clear that there is nothing soft about them. For the communiqué goes on to declare "our inflexible

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Published weekly and copyright, 1945, in the U. S. A. by The Nation Association, Inc., 20 Vesey St., New York 7, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, number 18, 1879, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Washington Editorial Bureau: 315 Kelllogg Building.

purpose" to destroy utterly German militarism and Nazism. To this end it is announced that all German armed forces will be disarmed and disbanded and the General Staff of the Reichswehr broken up. German military equipment will be either removed or destroyed and German industries adapted to military production eliminated or controlled. All war criminals are to be punished, and the Nazi Party and all its institutions wiped out. Reparations in kind are to be levied "to the greatest extent possible" in compensation for the damage wrought by the Germans in the war.

We have no criticism in principle of these proposals, but we regret the absence of any clear indication of the way in which they will be carried out. Some suggestions for enforcing them which have been widely if unofficially circulated would leave the German people without even a dim hope of recovery. However, the Big Three declare that it is not their purpose to destroy Germany, while pointing out that the continuance of a hopeless resistance must make the cost of defeat heavier. Indeed, the gravest threat to Germany's future is now offered by the suicide strategy of the Nazis. If they succeed in persuading their deluded followers to fight from town to town, scorching the earth behind them, and finally carrying on prolonged guerrilla warfare from their inner mountain fortress, the result will be a devastation that even the softest peace will not remedy. We hope that Allied propagandists in broadcasting the news of the Crimea Conference to the enemy will hammer home this fact.

There should be no complaint this time that the Big Three's communiqué does not communicate. If it does not completely satisfy our hunger for information it does provide a very filling meal. We hope, too, that the results of the conference will discourage efforts that have been made to picture the President as a "yes-man" for his two formidable colleagues. The agreements announced bear out earlier hints that a more positive American policy had been adopted. We think Mr. Roosevelt is to be credited with the emphasis placed on the Atlantic Charter, and the procedures devised for assisting the reestablishment of democracy in the liberated countries bear the marks of his craftsmanship. The first fruit of this agreement to take joint action in meeting political problems created by the war is Russia's abandonment of its stand-pat attitude on Poland. That signifies, we hope, the end of unilateral action and a union made more perfect.

The Shape of Things

ALTHOUGH NOTHING SPECIFIC WAS SAID ABOUT Spain in the report of the Big Three conference, the "leak" of Prime Minister Churchill's rebuke to Franco for his proposal of an anti-Soviet pact permits us to hope that a new policy toward Spain will soon be evident. If new proof is needed of the Spanish government's continued complicity with the Hitler regime, it is readily available in the recent outrageous broadcasts by Falange radio stations. With Zhukov's army threatening Berlin and with Eisenhower ready to strike in the West, the Valladolid radio said: "The Germans are preparing a sensational blow to stop the Soviet advance. They have now dug in in positions where they are resisting while awaiting the hour of the counter-attack." The broad-

cast went on: "General Franco's Spain and Germany are the two European countries that still have vital energies. The great confidence apparent in Goebbels's speeches is keeping with military events. Germany is serene, aware of her own destiny; she is ready to save herself and Europe. All this on February 4, 1945! Being farther removed from the front lines, Radio Valladolid spoke with greater optimism than Radio Berlin. Americans may be inclined to laugh at this nonsense. But laughter at similar statements made by Hitler in 1938 has already cost this country many thousands of American lives, and it must not be forgotten that Franco Spain is an important factor in Hitler's plan to continue the war even after military defeat."

★

SUCH A CHANGE IN POLICY WOULD NOTABLY improve the United States' position at the Foreign Ministers Conference which will begin on February 21 in Mexico City. We know that various Latin American countries are preparing to introduce at this conference the question of severing relations with Franco. Those who demand a break are inspired by two motives. One is the warm sympathy for the Spanish Republican cause throughout the Latin countries of the Western Hemisphere. The other is the desire to rid America of the Falangist pest. Both sentiments were expressed with force by the Mexican Under Secretary of the Interior, Señor Casas Aleman, when he addressed the big Spanish Republican rally in the Arena Mexico on January 29 as President Avila Camacho's personal representative. His remarkable speech, of which the American press took scant notice, appeared in full on the front page of every Mexican newspaper. It amounted to the extension of the kind of recognition to "the only Spain we love and respect." Nothing would place the United States delegation to the pan-American conference in a better position to overcome Latin America's enormous distrust of us than if Stettin could appear there not as Franco's advocate but as the friend of Spanish democracy.

★

SOME CHOICE RUMORS ABOUT LEND-LEASE WERE laid at rest by the Foreign Economic Administration at the recent hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In response to the charge that the cigarette shortage was due to lend-lease operations, the FEA pointed out that our lend-lease exports totaled only about 1¼ per cent of our cigarette production in 1944. The rumor that Canadians were growing fat on American lend-lease butter was exploded by the fact that Canada has received no butter, or any other commodity, under lend-lease. The story that the British were buying aviation gasoline from us at 25 cents a gallon and reselling it to the American army at 55 cents a gallon collapsed when it was revealed that we neither sell gasoline to the British nor buy it from them. A companion tale to the effect that American troops were being outrageously overcharged for food by the British was punctured by the disclosure that all the food provided to our troops by the British was gratis as reverse lend-lease. Some of the rumors, like the one that the Russians were shipping lend-lease planes to Japan in exchange for rubber, were shown to have originated with the Berlin radio. Others, such as the story of a "square mile

Germany... energies... speeches... aware... and Europe... removed... greater... lined to... ents made... many the... forgotten... plan to...

THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION IS... to conquer the Bretton Woods plan by dividing it. ... report carefully timed for the opening of Congress... on the plan, which was approved by forty-four nations... summer, the International Monetary Fund is damned by... bankers, while the International Bank for Reconstruction... Development is boosted. The authors of the report are... course "heartily in accord with the objectives" of the... Bretton Woods agreements, but they consider that the pro... als for the fund which is designed to assist exchange... bilization introduce "a method of lending which is novel... d contrary to accepted credit principles." In banking cir... we suppose, it is inevitable that novelty should be con... d, *ipso facto*, dangerous, but we are surprised to find... at the fund's proposed mode of operation should be re... d as violating accepted credit principles. For the fund... designed to act as an international reserve bank, and its... mechanisms appear to be an adaptation of those employed... the Federal Reserve System. However, the bankers will... ve none of it and propose to transfer such of its functions... appear useful to them to the International Bank for... reconstruction and Development. This institution, which is... tended to make or guarantee long-term loans for ap... roved wealth-producing projects, should, in their view,... endowed with additional powers to negotiate currency... bilization agreements and originate loans for this purpose... he result would be to mingle long-term and short-term... dit operations in a way that we have always understood... as considered "unsound" banking practice. There are a... mber of other points in the bankers' report which are... open to serious criticism. But the major count against it is... at the scheme they advocate is very different from the one... approved by the forty-four nations at Bretton Woods—a... scheme which itself represented a compromise giving great... ight to American views. If Congress yields to the bank... clamor and proceeds to gut the present plan, there will... probably be no international agreement at all.

THE CANADIAN BY-ELECTION IN GREY NORTH... ang out the storm signals for Mackenzie King. The defeat... his Minister of Defense, General McNaughton, by a... rogressive-Conservative candidate brought the conscription... ue once more to the fore. Mr. King will face the people... the coming federal election badly shaken by his recent... Parliamentary crisis and further damaged by this latest re... iff. To make matters worse, his compromise formula on... conscription, displeasing enough to Ontario, has alienated... Quebec. Those who know their political way around say that... the French province which in the past has voted "le straight

King" will send to Ottawa a bloc of independent national-ists in protest against the government's betrayal of its anti-conscription pledge. Two factors, however, may change this picture. First, the violence of the pro-conscription senti-ment in Ontario as expressed in the recent by-election may drive the Quebecois back into the Liberal fold to avoid a fate worse than King. Second, if the war in Europe is over, the conscription issue may well fade into the back-ground. That brings up the matter of the C. C. F., which has been offering a strong challenge on the left and whose strength has been concentrated in the western provinces and in the industrial districts of Ontario. In the Grey North by-election, the C. C. F. candidate, Air Vice-Marshal God-frey fared rather badly. The district is largely rural and has never been a C. C. F. seat, but the conscription issue undoubtedly dulled the edge of the C. C. F. appeal. If, there-fore, the election is held while the war in Europe is still on, the Tories will exploit to the full the discontent and bitterness over the government's conscription policy. They will cer-tainly gain seats, although it is almost inconceivable that they will have enough to form a government. If, on the other hand, the election is delayed until the end of the war in Europe, the real test—and a much more genuine one—will be on the issue of post-war plans. Here the main con-tenders will be the Liberal Party and the C. C. F., for apart from their venom toward Mr. King the Progressive-Conservatives are bankrupt of political ideas. But no matter when the election is held it is quite possible that no party will emerge with a clear majority.

ALTHOUGH THE DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED ON Private Henry P. Weber of Vancouver, Washington, for refusing to drill has been commuted to life imprisonment, little can be said in defense of the army's handling of the case. Private Weber quite obviously should have been dealt with as a conscientious objector. While his objections to the bearing of arms do not stem from religious conviction and thus are not specifically covered by the law, hundreds of political objectors with similar views have suffered no greater indignity than being sent to the C. O. camps. Weber, how-ever, failed to obtain formal recognition as a C. O. When he reported his scruples against the use of arms to his induc-tion officer, that officer is reported to have instructed him to voice his objection to each specific order that went against the dictates of his conscience. When, in accordance with this instruction, he refused to drill, he was court-martialed and sentenced to be hanged. The Weber case is a flagrant excep-tion to a generally fair policy. The army's treatment of C. O.'s has been much more sensible and humane than in the last war and has coincided with the heightened respect for civil liberties in general. There have been more cases of stupidity than injustice. C. O.'s, as a rule, have been sent to work camps where conditions bear some faint resemblance to those experienced by our soldiers before they enter combat areas. Few would raise any complaint on this score. The stupidity is to be seen in the failure to put C. O.'s to useful work at the top level of their skills. There was the much-publicized case of Dr. C. C. Devault, a qualified scientist, who was denied laboratory facilities and sentenced to three and a half

years in jail. And there have been numerous cases of farmers and specially trained workers who have not been permitted to alleviate the man-power shortage. C. O.'s have willingly offered their bodies for experiment in the interest of human welfare. We should make better use of their brains and skills.

★

THE APPEAL FOR CHINESE UNITY ISSUED AS A joint statement by ten leading Chinese-language newspapers in the United States and neighboring countries must have come as a rude shock to the Kuomintang propagandists who have been busy assuring Americans that there is only one side to the Kuomintang-Communist controversy. The ten newspapers, representing well over half the total circulation of the Chinese-language press in North and South America, call for an immediate end of the one-party dictatorship in China and the creation of a national coalition government as an effective means of assuring victory over Japan. They urge that all restrictions on free speech and press be removed and that all patriotic parties and groups be given the same legal status. Our readers will find in the statement's condemnation of the blockade of the Border Region, of the existence of secret police, and of the lack of effective government measures to combat inflation and the black market striking confirmation of Edgar Snow's views as expressed in his article on Lin Yutang in this issue. The need for an end of recriminations between the Kuomintang and the Communists and for the creation of a united China was clearly indicated by Acting Secretary Grew in an official statement issued at Washington recently. Mr. Grew made it plain that our good offices were available for an accord that would unite China in the struggle against our common enemy.

Wanted: a Janitor

THE Committee on Un-American Activities needs a janitor, three clerks, and a definition of what, after all, is an un-American activity. These primary requisites are set forth in the *Congressional Record* of January 29 and in a letter written on January 20 by Representative Mundt to one hundred prominent Americans asking them to define the committee's objective. Mr. Mundt wrote that "unless it is held that there is no such thing as an un-American activity, Americans should be able to agree on what it is, and our committee could then expose it."

But not without a janitor, adds realistic Representative Cochran. On January 29 Mr. Cochran offered to the House Resolution 109 requesting funds with which the Committee on Un-American Activities might employ a clerk at \$3,900 a year, two assistant clerks at \$2,640 and \$2,109, and a janitor at \$1,560. As reported in the *Congressional Record*, the additional assistant clerk is needed because the committee has "eighty file cases and about twenty unopened boxes full of papers, and because the files are not catalogued or indexed," and also because someone has to be present whenever anyone outside the committee goes over its records. No one objected to the hiring of the clerks, but Representative Engel questioned the need for a janitor. "Committee after committee that meets once or twice a year has a janitor," he

complained. "I do not know what in the world they need a janitor for. The Committee on Territories, next to me, has not met three times a year, I believe, but it has a janitor. Representative Cochran, on the other hand, felt that the committee was entitled to a janitor "because every other committee of the House has one, and further because the man must look after some large rooms as well as keep the files clean."

The fact that any herculean character who undertakes to clean up the Dies Augean-stable files deserves more than the \$1,560 a year did not figure in the House discussion—did anyone raise the question whether the committee's first need is for a janitor or a *raison d'être*. To some the question may appear as irrelevant as the old problem of which came first, the chicken or the egg. But all will agree that if the egg is rotten it should be thrown out.

Enter the Air Trust

AT THE Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference, the United States delegation took a strong stand against monopoly. In the name of free competition it stoutly opposed the British plan for an international organization with broad powers to regulate international airline routes, frequencies, and rates. Such regulation, our representative declared, would make for a cartel system and would throttle the development of international commercial aviation; they desired no interference with the competitive ability of each country's airlines to get all the traffic they could based on efficiency. Senators Bailey and Brewster, who were members of the American delegation, concurred in this policy. More than that, according to Russell Porter of the *New York Times*, they were said to have made it clear that the kind of agreement which the British desired would have to take the form of a treaty and be ratified by a two-thirds' vote of the Senate. Such a treaty, they indicated, would encounter stiff opposition.

It is a little strange, therefore, to find that the Senate Sub-committee on Aviation, of which Senator Bailey is chairman and Senator Brewster ranking minority member, is apparently supporting the principle of a "community" company which would enjoy a monopoly of America's foreign air traffic. This is the principle for which Pan-American Airlines—up to the war in the possession of a *de facto* monopoly—has been fighting for years, openly at hearings of the Civil Aeronautics Board, quietly but no less strenuously in the Congressional lobbies.

On February 8 the *Wall Street Journal* published a series of extracts from a document drawn up by the Senate sub-

COMING IN THE NATION
The Legal Case Against Adolf Hitler
By Raphael Lemkin
The Walls of Stuyvesant Town
By Charles Abrams
Who are the Partisans?
By Milton Bracker

committee, which, after paying a handsome tribute to Pan-American and noting the general reliance of other nations on a single air-transport system in the international field, declares:

We are of the opinion that we must very seriously consider concentration upon one coordinated system in the international field in order (1) to meet foreign-flag competition; (2) to service our foreign policy in peace and in war; (3) to avoid loss and subsidies, i.e., to assure success; (4) to meet the demands of our commerce; (5) to insure uniformity of policy. . . . It is true that the people of this country . . . seek to avoid monopoly. But we do not carry this policy beyond reason. . . . We recommend a minimum of American-flag operators—even just one—in the foreign field and the highest degree of regulation in the public interest.

In a letter to the *Wall Street Journal* Senator Bailey has intimated that his subcommittee has not yet adopted a definitive policy and that this document is only one of a number of drafts circulated for purposes of discussion. However, the newspaper reports that other Senators "insist that the document is far from a preliminary work." It is rather a composite of various drafts, and while no formal vote has been taken on it, a majority of the subcommittee members are said to have indicated their support for its principles. Additional evidence of the headway this monopoly plan is making is the reintroduction by Senator McCarran, a member of the subcommittee, of a bill to provide for the creation of a single American overseas airline in which the domestic airlines would be permitted to participate.

The War Fronts

BY CHARLES G. BOLTE

THIS department views the war fronts tonight with the happy reflection that Abe Lincoln's birthday has been most fittingly celebrated with the announcement of great and encouraging agreement among the Big Three at Yalta, a Crimean town which the Red Army liberated a year ago. There may be discoveries of omissions and dirty deals, and we may all wake up with a hangover; but tonight one can be thankful for Lincoln and his memory, which still walks the earth, preserving the Union by principle and compromise compounded together in courage.

A strong believer in the twin principles of unity of command and the council of war, Lincoln would have been pleased by the military sections of the Yalta communiqué. The chief staff officers of the three nations most heavily involved in the war against Germany met and exchanged full information on current and pending operations. They agreed on the timing, scope, and coordination of the next blows, which are to be delivered from east, north, west, and south. (The points of the compass I italicize may have been thrown in to add to the discomfiture of the German General Staff—but then again, they may not have been.) Finally, they agreed to hold future meetings of the military staffs when necessary.

These decisions are all-important, not only for the final

This is not a policy to be condemned out of hand, always provided that there is genuine government regulation. But we suspect that such is not the idea of Juan Trippe, the dynamic and dictatorial chairman of Pan-American. He has hitherto been very successful in bending Congress to his purposes—a notable example was its refusal of a mail appropriation to the rival American Export Airlines—and if he is able to get legislative sanction for his monopoly plans, it will not be surprising to find that the public control provided is mainly window-dressing. It will be even less surprising if, once Pan-American has its exclusive charter, perhaps under a new name, it seeks to make a deal with the "chosen Instruments" of Britain and other countries, providing by private treaty an international cartel instead of the kind of international organization which the British and Canadian delegations at Chicago attempted to achieve by public treaty.

The monopoly plan, it is only fair to note, is not that of the Administration. In fact, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the State, War, and Navy departments are all believed to be opposed to it. But as the document quoted by the *Wall Street Journal* pointed out, "The forming of policy in air transportation is a function of the legislative department." That being so, this revelation that the competition we fought for so hard at Chicago is considered something less than sacrosanct in Congress is likely to be viewed curiously abroad. It may seem yet another proof to cynical foreigners that our antipathy to monopoly is far more a matter of preaching than of practice.

phases of the war against Germany, but for the increasing possibility of Russian participation in the final phases of the war against Japan, and above all for the years of pacification and heightened Allied accord which must follow the shooting war. One may hope that at Yalta the foundations were laid for a structure long desired—a true Joint Chiefs of Staff, drawing in the top Soviet commanders alongside their British and American opposite numbers. There has long been too wide a gap between the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs, sitting in Washington, and the Soviet Supreme Command, sitting in Moscow. The interchange of ideas, plans, and problems across a table top goes farther toward achieving a meeting of minds than any number of code cables. The announced agreement as to the timing of blows from all points of the compass should also eliminate most of the grumbles from both sides of Germany as to why the other fellow doesn't open up a second front at once.

While the big gears were conferring on new and heightened attacks, their friends on the fighting fronts were hammering away at the slowly fading German strength. The big actions continued in the east, where the Russian generals, having obviously read last week's edition of this column, proceeded according to the plan therein contained (I'm

boasting). Zhukov was held hard at the tip of his long salient around Küstrin and Frankfurt, and fierce battles raged on the Oder crossings near Berlin, while Rokossovsky and Konev fanned out into Pomerania and Silesia, broadening the tip of the salient, relieving the threat to Zhukov's exposed flanks, and posing new threats to the German troops in north and south. Instead of a long, narrow dagger pointed at Berlin, the Russians by Monday night occupied a great bulge thrusting into Germany, shouldering up toward Stettin and the Baltic, and pushing down behind Breslau and toward Dresden.

This movement of broadening the salient will probably continue until Zhukov has a firmer base from which to push off again toward Berlin, the unhappy capital. It remains to be seen whether Zhukov will be strong enough, and Berlin's defenders weak enough, so that he can push straight into the city, or whether he will go around in a double envelopment, cut off the city's communications, and continue on to the west and south while the following infantry goes in and cleans up the city. The latter course is traditional with the Red Army; but Berlin covers an enormous area, and will certainly be more difficult to encircle than Warsaw. Even if it is encircled, we have seen what the Germans are capable of doing in the way of protracted house-to-house defense at Budapest. If it proves too difficult to encircle and Zhukov decides to fight his way straight in, the Germans have the Stalingrad example before them, and it would be unwise to anticipate that Germans are less brave and cunning than Russians when fighting in defense of their homes.

How many times have the afternoon dailies announced that American armies have smashed their way through the last remnants of the Siegfried Line? I lost track about two months ago. This talk of lines and walls is most misleading. One thinks of a string of posts, or a brick wall through which an army thrusts its head, then its shoulders, then its

hips. The trouble presumably comes with the hips. It would present a more illuminating picture if one spoke of a defense area, or a deeply echeloned defense in depth. I realize that this would be difficult to fit in a headline, but it would make for more understanding of what Allied infantrymen are up against—tank traps, interlocking fire points, minefields, bunkers, plenty of wire, all of it under the fire of artillery which has been zeroed in to the exact yard; and then a couple of miles of broken, hilly, wooded, ravine-cut country (also under fire) and the whole thing is encountered once again.

As for that "comparatively open country leading to the Rhine," which lies beyond, it is full of towns and villages, every one of which is a better tank obstacle than can be erected in a field, every one of which will have to be fought through—or around, which is worse because it fouls up the supply lines and the mechanized columns.

The essential futility of military criticism was neatly illustrated last week by the revelation of the Roer dams, which the Germans controlled. We were all yapping about the no-progress of the armies across the Roer near Düren, and now three months later we hear that if they *had* progressed, the Germans would have opened the flood-gates and washed them down into the North Sea.

The British-Canadian drive through the Reichswald toward the Rhine has been a promising preparation for full-scale offensives in the west. Capture of Cleve provides elbow room for a swing to the south in the narrow space between the Rhine and the Maas. This area must be pretty well cleared before any crossing of the Rhine can have much hope of permanent lodging. Preliminary operations here, and farther south once the Roer subsides, will pave the way for some big blows that should stop the flight of German reinforcements to the east.

This Is What We Voted For

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, February 13

THE first reactions of the capital to the concrete and energetic communiqué from the Crimea Conference indicates that this will rank as one of the President's greatest achievements. With Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, he has taken us one firm step farther along the difficult road to a total victory and a stable peace. Much since November 7 has been disheartening to the day-by-day observer, but in the proceedings at Yalta the historic significance of Mr. Roosevelt's reelection is made plain—in foreign policy a continuation of close and friendly liaison among the leaders of the Big Three, the *sine qua non* of Axis defeat and post-war reconstruction. One can easily imagine Governor Dewey doing many of the same things and making many of the same appointments as Mr. Roosevelt since the election, but one cannot imagine a Republican President

reaching the Crimea agreement on Poland, as one cannot imagine a Republican President appointing a man of Henry Wallace's outlook as Secretary of Commerce. Whatever his compromises on less important matters and however his evaluation of detail and his sense of timing may differ from those of some of his progressive supporters, Mr. Roosevelt's course clearly remains charted toward the two major objectives of an enduring peace abroad and full employment at home. This is what we voted for.

In the sphere of military action the Crimea communiqué is regarded here as foreshadowing a new offensive against the Reich, this time from the north, probably through Denmark. Should the Germans be forced to fight on a fourth front, their collapse would be hastened, and there is much hopeful speculation about the Russian agreement to sit in with the Chinese at the United Nations Security Conference

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to be held at San Francisco on April 25. The date is the deadline for denunciation of the non-aggression pact between the U. S. S. R. and Japan, and it is felt that the Soviets would not risk this announcement, with all it may imply in Tokyo, unless they were confident that final victory over the Reich will be close enough in the next few weeks to enable them to handle a surprise attack by Japan. This reflects confidence by the U. S. S. R. not only in its own strength but in the trustworthiness of its allies. A related indication of the ever closer relations among the Big Three is found in certain phrases in the communiqué which seem to doom any hopes that might have been nurtured by the "Free German" generals in Moscow.

When Stalin joins in expressing an "inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism . . . to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff . . . remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production . . . remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people" (my italics), he must feel sure enough of his Western allies to shut the door on the use of the Marshal von Paulus crowd as an alternative instrument of Soviet policy. A declaration of intent to "disband all German armed forces" is a departure from earlier Stalin statements that seemed to promise the Reich the right to retain an army and opened an avenue of negotiation between Moscow and dissident German generals among its prisoners.* To use some of these generals as pawns against the West might at one time have seemed a grim political possibility in Moscow. Apparently the Crimea Conference has made Marshal Stalin feel that no such dangerous game will be necessary. This is regarded here as not the least of the President's achievements at Yalta.

Even so fruitful a conference as the one just closed cannot be expected to solve all mutual problems. It is noted here that while the leaders of the Big Three agreed on the establishment of a joint commission to discuss reparations, they have yet to establish a joint commission on war crimes. The communiqué does, indeed, speak of "an inflexible resolve to bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment," but recent events have made it quite clear that this resolve is much less inflexible in Washington and London than it is in Moscow. It may be significant in this connection that the communiqué makes no reference to the industrialist collaborators of the Nazis whom the Russians also wish to punish but some Anglo-American circles are anxious to protect. This may explain the failure to set up a joint body to handle the many complex problems involved in punishing Nazi higher-ups and the omission of any joint statement warning the neutrals not to grant asylum to Nazi leaders. In this sphere it would seem that leaders of the Big Three do not yet see eye to eye. Franco Spain is one of the neutrals which need renewed warning, and the Argentine is another. Here the differences among the powers are well known.

It is good to know that there will be closer cooperation and consultation among the Big Three in the future in regard to liberated countries, and it is hoped that they will also decide in the near future to begin informal but detailed

discussion of the problems which will arise in the occupation of Germany. The announcement that the Reich will be split into three and almost certainly—when the French join in—four separate spheres of military control does not solve these problems; it only sets the stage for them. There will be a joint military commission in Berlin, but this also will not be enough to make certain that the occupying powers carry out their pledge to extirpate all traces of Nazism in the Reich. The Russians are better qualified for this task by political training, temperament, and the working-class basis of their regime. Unless there is mutual discussion, we may find Nazi elements taking refuge underground in the more equable and complacent climate of the English or American zone of occupation. This would be dangerous not only for the future of the Reich but for future relations among the occupying powers.

It is in the handling of these concrete problems that Allied unity and efficiency will be tested rather than in the formal details of voting rights and the structural charts for the projected world security organization. But it is on the latter and above all on the Polish settlement that discussion in Congress and by the opposition will center. The position to be taken by the Republican Party is not to be judged from the first approving statements evoked by the Crimea communiqué. Senators Austin of Vermont and White of Maine have applauded the results of the conference, but both are internationalist Republicans. Herbert Hoover, with unexpected and admirable magnanimity, has praised the President's work. But Vandenberg, the bell-wether of the party majority on foreign policy, indicated that he was undecided about the Polish settlement. It is on the Curzon line that the main battle will be fought.

The danger is not from the extreme isolationists like Wheeler; they command the sympathies of only a negligible minority in the country and the Senate. The danger, as in the old League fight, lies in those who express themselves as fully in accord with the need for preventing German resurgence and establishing world peace but—This time the leader of the "but" brigade is Vandenberg. Until the announced results of the Crimea Conference, he seemed to offer a bridge, however shaky, between the old isolationism and world cooperation. But the final settlement of the Polish question at Yalta brings fully into view the most treacherous aspects of the Vandenberg proposal. Now to propose the reopening of the Polish settlement after the war would be to disrupt the Allied unity and confidence on which not only the military strategy but the diplomatic decisions of the Crimea Conference were based. Not the slightest cost of the Vandenberg proposal would be Soviet cooperation in the war against Japan. To insist on perfectionism along the Pripet Marshes might mean payment in American lives on Pacific islands. That would be a high price to pay for Polish megalomania and American domestic politics.

CORRECTION: In last week's article, Wallace: Second Round, the last sentence of the second paragraph should begin, "Fortunately, Senator Barkley, with the help of Vice-President Truman, obtained the floor . . ." Through a typographical error Barkley was transmuted into Bailey.

* "It is not our aim," Stalin said on November 8, 1942, "to destroy all military forces in Germany."

Labor Meets in London

BY MARGARET STEWART

London, February 9 (by Cable)

THIS is the first peace conference." With these words the chairman of the London County Council welcomed the delegates to the World Trade Union Congress, which opened in London's blitz-scarred County Hall on February 6. The congress is certainly the greatest international gathering of labor ever held. More than two hundred delegates are here, representing nearly fifty million workers in forty-five countries. They have come from every quarter of the globe—in the words of the hymn, "from Greenland's icy mountains to India's coral strand." There are Indians, Russians, Jews, Chinese, men who fought in the *maquis* of France and Belgium or with Tito in Yugoslavia, men who fought against fascism in Spain before anti-fascism was fashionable, Americans and Latin Americans, delegates from the British Commonwealth, Swedes, Swiss, and Irish from the neutrals. The only condition of admittance is a trade-union card carried by an opponent of fascist dictatorship. These men have met, in the words of British transport leader Deakin, "to chart a course for mankind."

The congress is dominated, just as the peace conference will be, by the Big Three—Britain with 7,000,000 members, Russia with 27,000,000, and the United States (C. I. O.) with 6,000,000. From these three countries come the three presidents: George Isaacs, chairman of the Trades Union Congress; Vassili Kuzmetsov, chairman of the Soviet trade unions, who learned his English at Ford's in Detroit; and R. J. Thomas, vice-president of the C. I. O. and head of the Automobile Workers. The three vice-presidents are Saillant, of France, a leader of the resistance; Lombardo Toledano, the forceful Mexican leader representing the Latin American Federation of Labor; and Chu Hsueh-san, who heads 600,000 Chinese workers.

The opening session was smooth sailing, being largely taken up with formalities—appointment of a Standing Orders and a Credentials Committee, addresses of welcome, a message from Prime Minister Churchill, a humdrum harangue by Deputy Prime Minister Attlee. All this took time, since it had to be translated into French, Russian, and Spanish.

A squall blew up at the end of the second day when the Standing Orders Committee presented its report. Sir Walter Citrine, bronzed from his visit to Greece, mounted the rostrum and roundly condemned its decisions. First, it had recommended the inclusion of former enemy countries—Italy, Finland, Rumania, and Bulgaria—on the ground that circumstances had changed since the congress preparatory committee first decided to exclude them. "How can you discuss the treatment of the enemy with people who until yesterday were themselves enemies?" asked Sir Walter. He did not think that any of these countries, with the possible exception of Finland, could claim a stable or democratic trade-union movement.

Secondly, the Standing Orders Committee had recom-

mended the admission of a Lublin Pole whose credentials had been flown from Moscow. This issue, urged Citrine, was still under consideration by the government. Why should the trade unions rush in where ministers feared to tread? Finally, the committee had recommended that the voting should be by countries—one country, one vote—with a two-thirds' majority constituting a decision. This, said Sir Walter, was contrary to the spirit and purpose of the conference, which was intended to be only advisory. This issue is undoubtedly the most critical before the delegates. The British fear being swamped by the votes of Russia and the numerous countries which, as has become increasingly obvious in the course of the conference, follow the Soviet line.

The third morning opened in a heavily charged atmosphere which was not relieved by an uncompromising speech from Lombardo Toledano or by the criticism of "Comrade Citrine" voiced by Tomasov, a Soviet delegate. R. J. Thomas, who had flown from America and rushed straight to the hall from the airfield, poured oil on the troubled waters. He moved reference back to the Standing Orders Committee of the first controversial sections of their report, that is, the recommendations on the ex-enemy countries and Lublin. This was agreed, and the Standing Orders Committee eventually decided that the ex-enemies should be invited to send representatives whose credentials would be examined by the Credentials Committee to determine whether they should be delegates or merely observers. This dispute, which at one stage threatened to break up the conference, may be a foretaste of the far greater controversy which promises to develop next week.

On the first item of the agenda, the Allied war effort, there is complete agreement, even if each delegation tends to compete in boosting the contribution his nation has made to the defeat of fascism. America came out of this very well with a munitions production record showing an elevenfold increase in three years and the virtual disappearance of time lost through strikes. Reid Robinson, head of the Metal Workers, who gave this report in the absence of Hillman and Thomas at the opening session, called for cooperation among the Allied nations in peace as in war.

The delegations are agreed, too, about the issues of the peace settlement. There is a solid core in favor of hard terms for Germany. The C. I. O. and the Chinese, especially, are determined that what is sauce for Germany shall also be sauce for Japan, and so far it seems that the Russians, although not at war with Japan, are ready to agree.

It is over the future of the international union movement that a real cleavage may occur. The Russians, the C. I. O., the French, and the Latin Americans want a brand-new international and not the resurrection of the moribund International Federation of Trade Unions. The British T. U. C. wants to reorganize the federation and extend its membership. They have a close link with the A. F. of L., which

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as categorically refused to sit at a round table with the I. O. and the Soviet unions. A decision to form a new international would cause the A. F. of L. to retire to splendid isolation, a state of affairs which the British want to avoid. This was the threat made by Robert Watt, A. F. of L. leader, at the I. F. T. U. meeting in London last week, for which he was hotly attacked by Will Lawther, blunt-speak-

ing British miners' leader. It may be that these differences will settle themselves, though the stage seems set for a major ideological clash. Low, the cartoonist, summed up the situation brilliantly in a cartoon showing Olga, the fair Russian maiden, seated between two suitors, Citrine and Hillman, with a portrait of Green, a frosty-faced old maid, frowning down from the wall.

Exports: Britain's Triple-A Priority

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

BRITISH business men don't like war-time economic controls any more than their American confrères do, but they are resigned to their continuance for a long time not only after VE Day but after VJ Day. Chafe as they may against price ceilings, material and labor priorities, control of investment issues, import and export restrictions, foreign-exchange licensing, and other limitations on freedom of action, most of them realize that such controls must be relaxed gradually if chaos is to be avoided. That does not mean there will be no pressure to remove restrictions; almost certainly it will be applied by consumers who, having suffered years of "austerity" with exemplary patience, will naturally hail the advent of peace as an opportunity for a buying orgy.

But that is just why it will be impossible to restore a free market quickly, leaving the forces of supply and demand to regulate production and prices. Suppose all controls were to be removed at one blow, what would happen? The one thing which is plentiful in Britain is money. Despite very high taxes, retained income per capita has increased by nearly 50 per cent. But with necessities rationed and all other goods extremely scarce if available at all, people have not been able to spend their incomes. As a footnote in the White Paper on Employment Policy, published last June, puts it, "The present clothing ration provides roughly one-half of the pre-war consumption of clothing. . . . Only about one household in ten can now buy a pair of sheets and one household in five a pair of blankets each year. Only one person in seven can now buy each year a knife, fork, or spoon, one person in three a kettle, saucepan, or frying pan, one person in four a teapot or jug. The manufacture of carpets, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, and other household appliances is virtually prohibited."

The other side of the medal is the growth of private savings, which in the first five years of the war amounted to \$33,200,000,000—equal to the British national income at its present swollen level. Of this, \$12,800,000,000 represented small savings in defense bonds, savings accounts, and so on. In addition, though not to the same extent as in this country, currency has been hoarded in teapots and under mattresses. Thus with the end of the war a keen desire for goods will be combined with unprecedented purchasing power. Only the goods will be absent, or in extremely short supply. In such a situation the abolition of rationing and price ceilings could have only one result—

competitive bidding for goods, which would create an inflationary situation in short order.

Moreover, many of the things most missed by British consumers during the war—fruit, dairy products, wine, textiles, toys, household gadgets—are imported, or manufactured largely from imported materials. If import restrictions and foreign-exchange licenses were abandoned, traders and manufacturers would buy heavily abroad, creating a tremendous demand for foreign currencies. At the same time, with a booming home market business men would take little interest in promoting exports; so that the inflow of foreign exchange, already far below British needs, would be reduced to a trickle. The inevitable consequence would be the rapid exhaustion of British reserves of gold and foreign currencies, followed by sharp external depreciation of sterling.

One of the few things about which most American business men agree with the Administration, even though they differ about ways to achieve it, is that the earliest possible stabilization of foreign-exchange rates is a prime interest of the United States. So long as there is no certainty about what the pound or the franc or the guilder will be worth in terms of dollars, there can be no orderly development of foreign trade. Serious depreciation of sterling after the war would be most injurious to American exporters, especially since, in falling, sterling would drag many other currencies with it. But it is the British exchange and import controls which have made it possible to maintain an official rate of \$4.02 throughout the war. It is therefore to America's interest that these pegs should not be removed before Britain has had time to restore its balance of payments, which, as I explained in my last article,* the war has knocked completely out of kilter.

It is to be feared that many American exporters, finding their trade with Britain, or British colonies, restricted after the war by import quotas or even by flat embargoes on certain types of goods, will overlook these facts. When I was in London last fall I discussed this matter with an official of the American Chamber of Commerce there who was rather gloomy about the possibility of misunderstandings in America over British economic policies. He agreed that import and other controls would have to be maintained for a considerable period after the war but said that he had no doubt many American business men would consider such measures discriminatory. He thought that firms whose prod-

* Britain's Economic Dunkirk, in the issue of February 10.

acts were likely to obtain low priorities would probably attempt to maintain their good-will in Britain by setting up factories there. But this step will not free them from control trouble: since Britain, for some time, will experience shortages of both materials and labor, it will have to proceed on the principle of first things first. Thus the manufacturer of, say, radio combinations may have to wait for a building permit until more urgently needed houses have been constructed.

In the January issue of *Foreign Affairs* W. Manning Dacey, editor of the *Banker* (London), pointed out that after economic demobilization and reconversion Britain and America will face diametrically opposite problems. The chief difficulty in the United States will be to reverse the trends which have made possible the high level of war-time savings. It will be necessary to discourage thrift as a mass virtue, to stimulate spending, to foster higher living standards. Unless this is done, production will be choked, and deflation and large-scale unemployment will follow. Britain, on the other hand, will have to damp down the demand for consumer goods and encourage savings in order to provide for reconstruction at home and a great expansion of exports.

This is a task that will call for very delicate handling by the British government. The average Briton will understand that housing must have a number-one priority and that the rebuilding of schools and hospitals is more urgent than the restoration of country clubs. But a recent Gallup poll indicated a wide lack of understanding of the fact that since Britain must import to live, it must export or die. Consequently, the limitation of meat imports in order to conserve foreign exchange, or the assignment of textiles to foreign markets while clothes rationing continues at home, is likely to cause discontent, and calls for a greater amount of popular education than the government has yet attempted.

Psychologically and politically, it would, in fact, be impossible to attempt to hold consumption to war-time standards, even though by so doing internal reconstruction and the recovery of export trade might be speeded. Some relief from enforced frugality there must be, and in the interest of morale fairly high priorities may be given to goods which are not strictly necessities. It may be considered important, for instance, to give early satisfaction to the British craving for oranges and bananas; or to release exchange to permit the bare legs of British women to be clothed in nylons as soon as America has a surplus for export. In this connection it is noteworthy that, despite the need for conserving dollars, the British government has permitted increasing imports of American films during the war, the value in 1943 being more than twice that in 1939.

But while some consideration may be shown to morale builders, preference will be given to imports of essential foods, raw materials, and machinery for increasing the efficiency of British industry. Moreover, such materials and machinery will be allocated first of all to manufacturers who undertake to sell all or a considerable part of their output abroad. For exports must rank high in the order of priorities if Britain is to recover its external purchasing power and its ability to buy freely throughout the world.

This is how *Planning*, a periodical issued by the British organization PEP, sums up the situation:

Just as production for war is a patriotic duty now, so production for export will be a patriotic duty after the war. Workers for their part must realize that when they help make a motor car, or a suit of clothes, or a pair of silk stockings for export, they are, in effect, producing the bread, butter, and tea which they will have for breakfast next morning. . . . Just as it will be a crying scandal if luxury hotels are built while any family lacks a decent house, or if Mayfair rides to the theater in new Rolls-Royces while Wigan walks to work because there is a shortage of bicycles, so it will be more insidious and no less scandalous if new satin evening dresses are sold to decorate English debutantes when they might have been exported in exchange for raw cotton from the U. S. A., meat from the Argentine, grain from Canada, or oil from Venezuela.

In my last article I pointed out that in order to pay for imports on the pre-war scale, which means in order to maintain its pre-war standard of living, Britain would have to increase exports by more than 50 per cent of the average for 1936-38. However, recovery of the export trade has to start from a much lower base than the pre-war figure since, owing to the concentration of man-power and materials on munitions, overseas sales have been cut back with increasing severity. In 1943, the last year for which figures are available, British exports, excluding most "mutual-aid" shipments, were only 50 per cent of the 1938 value and only 30 per cent of the 1938 volume. American cash exports, excluding lend-lease, have remained much closer to their pre-war level. That comparison has been the cause of a good deal of resentment among British business men. They feel that their American competitors have not only had a better chance to hold their own markets but an opportunity to win former British customers. This belief is not without foundation. During the war American exporters have had things pretty much their own way in Latin America, always a heavy buyer of British goods, and have established firm footholds in a number of African and Asiatic countries where British traders once predominated. The *New York Times* of December 15, 1944, quotes R. C. Thompson, export manager of the Electric Auto-Lite Company and member of an official mission to the Middle East, as saying that in that region "American exporters have gained almost immeasurably in a competitive position with Great Britain."

In the period immediately after the war Britain, however, will probably be able to regain ground. With the whole world starved for goods and with many important markets, such as Argentina, Brazil, India, and Egypt, well supplied with foreign exchange, there will be trade opportunities for both America and Britain, and selling will not be a serious problem. For Britain the problem will be rather one of production, of raising output sufficiently to take care of urgent home demand while leaving a surplus for shipment overseas. As we have seen, the expansion of exports is so vital a national interest that the government will have to take action to divert industrialists from the easy pickings of the domestic market to the more strenuous business of catering for the foreigner. The British government is taking steps, just as the State Department is, to improve its commercial-intelligence service; it is also extending its pre-war export-credit insurance scheme. But such measures are ancillary to an official undertaking to provide the export industries

with a high priority for "raw materials, labor, and factory space freed from war purposes." In addition, such industries will almost certainly be given a preferred position so long as new capital issues are subject to "rationing."

It is unlikely that the export industries in this country will be accorded similar privileges. The need being less urgent, the necessary control over production and consumption would be far more strongly resisted. The tendency of American business in the immediate post-war period will be to concentrate on filling the pent-up demands of the home market before turning their salesmen farther afield. This may give the British some opportunity to catch up.

I have outlined here the kind of program British economists and government officials believe will be necessary to take their country through the economic strains of the post-war transitional period, which it would be optimistic to put off much less than five years. It is the kind of program that the average Briton will find it hard to take after his strenuous and sparse living of the war years. He will find jobs plentiful, but his standards of consumption, while showing some improvement, will remain comparatively low. Taxes are likely to stay high to discourage spending, and the drive for savings will continue. A good deal of grumbling is inevitable; it may be mollified if there is a slow but steady improvement in conditions. On the other hand, if management of the controls is unskilful, a rising tide of discontent may undercut the government's purpose.

Such an outcome would have grave consequences not only for Britain but for the world. Britain occupies a key position in international economy owing to the enormous market it offers for the goods of other countries. But if that market is to be fully restored, Britain must reestablish its balance of payments at a level which will enable it to finance whatever volume of imports is required to maintain and gradually raise its standard of living. The achievement of that aim depends a good deal on the self-discipline of its people—a quality they have shown in high degree during the war. But it also depends on the policies of other countries, and particularly those of the United States.

If the forces of economic internationalism and cooperation triumph in this country during the transitional period, Britain is likely to persevere with its efforts to restore its economic position to the point where a return to its traditions of multilateral trade can be safely undertaken. If, on the other hand, America, showing lack of understanding of its problems and impatience with the restrictions it must temporarily adopt, reverts to economic isolation, then Britain may heed the siren voices which are hymning the advantages of the unorthodox trade routes pioneered before the war by Dr. Schacht.

In a further article I propose to review the long-term outlook for British trade and to discuss the sharp controversy on international economic policy which is being waged in London.

[The second of a series of three articles.]

The Battle of the Rhone

BY ANDREE VIOLLIS

ALONG the road that leads from Montélimar to Loriol in the Rhône Valley, I looked on the terrible and death-scarred scene of a battle. History will remember this Battle of the Rhône as the first great victory of Americans over Germans in the south of France.

Straight, wide and smooth, flanked on one side by the railroad and on the other by the great river, the road stretches out toward Valence. The battle started on August 28. A few days before, the people around Avignon could observe moving north, like a green and yellow caterpillar, an unending chain of German vehicles of all kinds: troop trucks, tanks, armored cars, self-propelled guns and machine-guns, motorcycles, and occasionally one of those small, swift staff-officer cars, elegant and shining—all camouflaged, or rather dressed up, with leafy branches, like Birnam Wood moving on Dunsinane. Interspersed among the steel helmets were the bare heads, the caps, and the stiff-brimmed hats of the Vichy militia, some with their wives and children, some carrying suitcases, all fleeing from inexorable justice.

Three German divisions were on the march, the Second Panzer Division forming the vanguard and doing the scouting. Many of the soldiers looked worn out and discour-

aged, but some were vigorous with youth and the sunshine. They laughed and sang and joked. Weren't they going north, going home? They would see their families again, the families they had left almost five years ago. If a car stopped for some reason, the officers strutted about, chests pushed out as usual, well-fed and arrogant, with the traditional rolls of pink flesh showing above their collars, their lips moist and greedy.

This was not flight. Of course not; it was simply "an orderly retreat," a "shortening of the front," necessary because the Americans had landed on the coast. They were still far away, around Grasse, Draguignan, Gap. They would need wings to catch up with the Germans. As for the *maquis*, those "damned terrorists" had never been easy to handle, but now they were on the other side of the river and would hardly dare to attack such an important convoy.

Then, quick as lightning, formidable, unexpected, catastrophe struck the caterpillar chain. The terrible fate of those three German divisions was soon written in deadly characters for twenty kilometers along the road.

The American troops had landed in one operation from Cavalaire to St. Tropez, between Cap Nègre and the Golfe de Fréjus. Parachutists had been dropped behind the Mon-

tagnes des Maures toward Le Luc and Le Muy. Soon the whole Maures *massif* was encircled by Allied troops with their spearhead pointing toward l'Esterel. The beachheads and the terrain through which the troops deployed had been chosen by the French Forces of the Interior, who had shown good judgment. From then on everything went along quickly.

On August 17 the Americans entered Drolguignan, which had been liberated by the F. F. I. on the sixteenth. Avoiding frontal attack, they by-passed the two big ports of Toulon and Marseille and advanced toward Brignoles and Manosque. They occupied Castellane on the seventeenth and Digne on the nineteenth. At Digne General Butler took command of a column consisting of panzers, tank destroyers, excellent artillery, and a few gliders, and captured Sisteron, Gap, and Corps on the Route Napoléon. Resistance was weak and from two to four thousand prisoners were taken in each town; only Corps was fiercely defended.

Two columns then marched on Grenoble, which was taken on the twenty-second. Another swung toward Die, Crest, Saillans, along the Drôme River, and established itself in the hills above the road from Montélimar to Loriol. About two hundred tanks, cannon of all calibers, and machine-guns were massed there.

All this had been so carefully planned and was accomplished in such secrecy that the Germans had no idea what was happening around them. Ahead of them the Drôme joined the Rhône. The Americans, together with the F. F. I., dynamited the bridge, blocked the road with a few armored cars flanked by a small contingent of men, and waited. They waited for two long days and nights, anxious lest their guess had been wrong.

Then suddenly through the trees they saw the mighty German column advancing, preceded by tanks and accompanied by five armored trains mounting 260- and 380-millimeter guns. The men at the road block started a skirmish. Then, on a given signal, American tanks, mobile artillery, and machine-guns poured their deadly fire into the convoy. Taken by surprise as they were, the Germans fought back fanatically all the afternoon. During the night they pushed forward with such desperate energy that the Second Panzer Division, though it suffered enormous losses, managed to break out of the trap.

As I stand here on a hill above the Rhône I can see the wreckage of the battle spread over the country below me. A vast graveyard of vehicles extends for twenty kilometers along the road. Many cars, even some of the big ones, have been thrown into the fields and lie there wheel up in the air. Others, smashed till they are nothing more than junk heaps, clog the ditches. Some have their metallic guts hanging out; others reach steel arms toward heaven. Wood and iron are burned out or blackened, but some of the camouflage branches are still strangely green and alive, mocking the destruction.

And the men? Fresh earth covering long trenches marks the place where they were laid, misplaced and anonymous. For five or six thousand of them the retreat ended in death. Six thousand were taken prisoner.

Negro troops whose task it is to dispose of the corpses still move about the graveyard of cars. They have not yet finished their work. A stifling odor of burning and decay envelops the whole countryside.

The Battle of the Rhône will be remembered by the Germans as the beginning of the end.

China to Lin Yutang

BY EDGAR SNOW

THIS is a day of regret for me, because I have to offend a writer whom I have admired and respected, and who has been a friend of mine, for many years. But what else can you do about a book written with such unexpected smallness of faith in a man's people, so full of mischief, and so lacking in dignity and pride?

For "The Vigil of a Nation" by Lin Yutang (John Day, \$2.75) libels some of our best allies among the Chinese people, allies who happen to be led by Chinese Communists—who happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of establishing communism in China in the near future, and have an administration which is, according to most people who have seen it, more nearly democratic than any China has yet known. Simply because of Lin's anti-red tirade, his book will be exploited by ignorant and reactionary groups here which ordinarily take no interest in China's welfare. And because the people whom he attacks are permitted no representative in this country who can refute him, it is obliga-

tory that the few Americans who know the facts should seriously hold him to account.

In the present volume the author leaves his role of compiler of ancient wisdom and wit to enter a new métier, that of polemicist and party propagandist. True, in one place he does call this a travel book, and when he isn't bewailing Chinese peasants and workers—the 80,000,000 led by the Communists—as "Bundists," there is some "booster"-like praise for Chinese food and the cultural greatness of Chin and T'ang. But the main purpose of his book is to extol the virtues of the Kuomintang, or National Party, under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as the sinned-against in China, while denouncing the Kungchantang, or Communist Party, as the sinner.

There is nothing wrong with giving the case for the Kuomintang; both sides should be heard. Even after hearing them the outsider has little chance of knowing the whole truth because all war is full of falsehood, with the percentage

rising sharply when you get into civil war. Still, you get the shape of a thing better the more angles of its contradictions you see. The trouble here is that Lin's contradictions merely contradict, in the manner of the spoiled child whose best retort to a point of critical logic is to shout, "You're ten times all those things yourself."

Although Lin sets himself up as an authority on the Chinese Communists, he nowhere gives evidence of having talked to any Communist outside Kuomintang concentration camps. He never visited any part of guerrilla China. He ridicules correspondents who at least took the trouble to see what they write about, and he asserts that to find the "evils of totalitarianism" in China "one must go to Yenan"; yet he himself never went there. Lin doesn't even define his political geography very well, and a paragraph of simple home truth is necessary to help the reader locate himself in the scenes described by this self-ycept "cultured vagabond."

The dominating political truth about China is that it is partly a colonial, in the main a semi-colonial, country. The richest and most advanced areas are in Japanese hands—except where guerrillas oppose them. But the country will soon be liberated largely as a result of the destruction, by American arms, of Japanese naval and air power, the main forces of the Japanese army, and Japan's home bases. The question will then arise: what kind of government will prevail in an independent China, after eight years—and in the case of Manchuria fifteen years—of colonial administration?

In the still uninvaded provinces of China the Kuomintang selects and appoints all officials. Chiang Kai-shek is the "leader" of that party. He is also the party-elected chief of state. Nobody in China except a minority of the 2,000,000 members of the Kuomintang Party ever cast a vote to keep Chiang Kai-shek in power. In this picture neither the Communist Party nor any other political party has any *de jure* existence. It is still a fact that the Kuomintang government has never officially rescinded its anti-Communist laws, which make membership in the Communist Party an offense punishable by death. Under such a regime no political opposition can exist, except with the support of armed forces. When Lin Yutang demands the disbandment of the Communist-led forces before the one-party dictatorship is abolished, he is substantially demanding the disbandment of the party.

All this Lin knows quite well, though nowhere does he explain it. Against this background, and relying largely on his own "guesses," hearsay, and material drawn from a book written by "Chen Chung," whom Lin himself apparently does not know, he draws up this indictment of the guerrillas in North China: the Chinese Communists began the war (Lin quotes Sun Fo) with about 40,000 to 50,000 troops; their rule is feared by the peasants because of its "regimentation and terror"; their leaders are undemocratic; the people hate them because, among other things, women have equal status with men; they have rarely fought the Japanese, but have taken fifty towns from the Chinese for every one from the enemy; they commit numberless atrocities against innocent people; they destroy Chinese culture and have no reverence for Chinese history; they have driven Kuomintang troops out of most of the north; and the Kuomintang cannot make peace with them because they won't give up their arms.

tang cannot make peace with them because they won't give up their arms.

Lin admits that all Communist expansion has taken place behind the Japanese lines. He admits that the Eighth Route and New Fourth (Communist) armies have been blockaded by Kuomintang troops since 1940, that they have received no aid from the government, that they have had no help from either Russia or America. Nevertheless, despite these handicaps, somehow those 40,000 "terrorists" have destroyed, according to Lin, most of the Kuomintang troops in the north—originally supposed to number some half a million. They have occupied an area commanding the support of about 80,000,000 people, organized millions of Chinese youths, and increased their own forces to about half a million. Lin fears that they may soon control half of China, especially if America should give them arms, food, medicines, and financial help, instead of unqualifiedly supporting the Generalissimo. What a potent "40,000"!

Lin asserts that the Communists constitute China's "only problem of national unity." Wang Ching-wei, deputy chief—second only to the Generalissimo—of the Kuomintang, became Japan's puppet leader at Nanking, together with a host of other Kuomintang adherents, but there were no Communists there. From Kuomintang armies Japan recruited the bulk of its puppet troops. Among the Kuomintang generals who joined the puppets was Pan Pin-hsien, once field commander of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist campaigns. But such minor deviations are no threat to "national unity" in Lin's view.

At the beginning of his book Lin promises to "try to be fair" about Chinese politics and to "give a good balanced judgment." Everywhere he goes, however, he stays with Kuomintang officials, while nowhere does he give evidence that he lived with workers or peasants for even a few days. Toward the end, he says ingenuously, "I am all for the government [the Kuomintang]. The government has launched an anti-Communist program as a basic part of its state policy for the last seventeen years." This includes the entire period of the anti-Japanese war.

Lin's whole trouble is that, after seventeen years of this anti-Communist vigil, half of which he has spent in comfortable America, he never ventured into the scene of conflict to see how it was with his people. During the present trip, he states, he heard a machine-gun fired "for the first time in his life." He heard it then, ironically enough, not at the front, but when he was a guest of General Hu Tsung-nan, at the "model concentration camp" for Communists at Sian. There Lin, who elsewhere "does not think it [the Kuomintang] has ideas of rule of terror and force," was "happy and relieved" to find that his fellow-Chinese were being treated with "no unnecessary cruelty or inhumanity." He can't understand why Americans say this is a "fascist" feature of Kuomintang rule.

Lin gives us a long synthetic account of Chinese atrocities, which he blames entirely on Communists. Nearly all his material is a rehash of old Kuomintang propaganda, but Lin insists that it is "news" and asserts that in the past the Kuomintang tried to "hush up" stories of internecine strife.

Evidently a lot of things are "news" to Lin that are axiomatic to the Chinese. He was astonished to hear General Ho Ying-chin called "pro-Japanese" recently, but if he had been in China he could have heard 10,000 students denouncing him as such, as early as 1936, on the streets of Peiping. He would know that as early as 1938 the Kuomintang began sponsoring accounts attacking the Yen-an government as a "traitor party" and "alien party." Since then quite a number of pamphlets and books like Chen Chung's have been published, under party subsidy. As early as 1939 General Chang Chun, head of the War Areas Party and Political Affairs Commission, told me that Chungking had decided to "eradicate" by force all anti-Japanese organizations led by the Eighth Route Army in the guerrilla areas. All such activity was, he said, "illegal."

In that year also the Yen-an government listed various cases in which, it was alleged, Kuomintang forces had attacked the Eighth Route Army. Yen-an requested Chiang Kai-shek to send a military commission to investigate. Instead, the Kuomintang issued a long account of crimes allegedly committed by the Communists. I had no way of determining the truth about most of these conflicts. Having a long familiarity with civil-war propaganda technique I refrained from writing about them, as did other correspondents—not, as Dr. Lin supposes, because both sides did not furnish abundant material, but because of utter lack of means of verification or documentation.

Dr. Lin's ignorance of conditions of battle in China will probably go unnoticed by many of the elderly ladies whose hair will stand on end when they read his book. Take one or two examples. As evidence of Communist treachery, he reports that when Kuomintang troops behind the Japanese lines "passed through certain areas in secrecy, the Communists staged loud cheering processions of welcome to advertise their whereabouts to the enemy."

Compare a story he seems to think proves that Communists refuse to fight the Japs. He quotes an anonymous informant as stating that, in order to "force" an engagement on them, a Kuomintang Party director lured some Japanese troops to a base occupied by the Communists, who, as a result, "suffered severe casualties." This story has a ring of truth about it—though elsewhere Lin insists that it is only the Communists who stoop to such betrayals. Oddly, he seems unaware of the implications of this account, which he describes as "an amusing" story. Yet he complains that leftists in China have no sense of humor.

Lin deplores the ill-fed, ill-treated Kuomintang soldiers he saw in the rear—and the conscription system which enables the gentry to buy their sons from service while peasants are led off with ropes tied round their necks. Yet he thinks things must be better "at the front," where, he has heard, the soldiers "have the best of everything," and can "even grow their own vegetables."

Another example: Lin repeatedly states that government troops never invaded Eighth Route Army territory. Yet in a moment of inadvertence, when trying to prove that the Communist forces don't fight Japan, he reveals that a Kuomintang division was ordered to seize Wutaishan, a base which the Eighth Route Army has held ever since 1937, and which it was originally ordered to defend by the Generalissimo him-

self. He complains bitterly because the Kuomintang division was defeated in that quixotic venture.

One more sampling of the war observations of a "cultured vagabond." He tells us that the reason the Kuomintang troops in the north were always defeated was because, "not being ready for open war," they were always "taken by surprise." What, then, were they doing behind enemy lines if they were "not ready for open war"? Whence came their supposed sense of security from Japanese attack?

Lin denounces the guerrilla leaders for issuing their own currency, but thinks it is all right that their troops were never paid after 1940. Once he naively suggests that if Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, the Communist leaders, had gone to Harvard—as Lin did—instead of living with Chinese peasants and workers all their lives, they would doubtless be no more interested in revolution than he is. He disapproves of Yen-an's policy of "price control," but defends the black market under the Kuomintang. He thinks inflation, based on speculation and profiteering in land and commodity goods, must be handled through the "individualistic and not through the collectivist [state control] approach."

He disapproves of the Communists for collecting data on how many pigs and chickens, and presumably how many royalties, each family has. While admitting that price control "works" in the Communist areas, he says, "The Chinese would resent it." Here as elsewhere he gives evidence of thinking that anybody within the pale of the Communists promptly ceases to be Chinese. Thus, deploring the regime under which millions of Chinese now live in the guerrilla territory, freed from the Japanese, he "hopes that *the people of China*" will be spared this fate (my italics).

Of course, there is more to the book than politics. There is quite a lot about Confucius and the glory that was. It is astonishing, but apparently Lin recently visited the ruins of Ch'ang An, and the cradle of Chinese civilization, for the first time in his life; and he can't get over it.

Where Lin isn't denouncing the wicked Reds his whole book in China without the redeeming touch of the breath and blood of the nation's goodly youth and awakening peasantry with their sacrifices for a dream of the future; without any sense of what it means to be hungry and hunted and yet not ready to abandon your principles for a rice bowl, to have pus-filled sores on your bare feet, yet keep marching and smiling; to lose legs and arms for want of medicine, to shiver through bitter winters for lack of a padded silk gown, like Lin's, to believe in something for all men more than Confucius believed in all things for the family first.

But I am genuinely unhappy about Lin Yutang. It is a major tragedy for a Chinese writer, gifted as few men are to interpret his country to the English-speaking world, to have thus cut himself off from contact with some of the most vital and regenerative blood of his nation. One is bound to wonder about the reasons why he has suddenly taken this leap.

I do not attach much importance to the fact that Lin now holds a Chinese official passport, and thus is accountable to the Kuomintang. In his book he denies that he is actually paid by the party and that he has ever been compensated by its officials; and who would doubt his word? In fact, Lin

voices some criticism of the Kuomintang. He favors a Bill of Rights in China. He also advocates some democracy. He emphatically favors freedom of the press. He has, moreover, spoken personally to the Generalissimo about these shortcomings. He even admits that the reds have a few good points, such as that they are "organizing the people for self-government, that they have workers' unions, peasant unions, women's unions, and have reduced the interest on loans." In contrast to that he thinks there must be "no freedom of speech, no freedom of belief" under the Chinese Communists.

To have the right to "organize for self-government," to form labor unions and peasant unions, to give women equal status with men, may not seem important for someone who doesn't have to make a living working on the yellow soil of China, or in a sweatshop, but it is certain that without such means of expression no label of "democracy" on a government would mean anything for the vast majority of Chinese people. Dr. Lin, in his status, may not think such rights are in themselves an end worth fighting for, but if so he mistakenly identifies himself with a nation of men and women who do.

"Nowhere in Kuomintang China," reports Lin, "have I yet seen or heard the common people of China played up as all-important individuals. . . . Yet until the people of China are made to feel that the 'little people' are the important people, China will fail to qualify for the title of democracy." There is also no doubt whatever that in guerrilla China Lin, had he looked there, could have found a society preaching just that doctrine—and to a large extent practicing it.

It happens that there is available fresh testimony about Communist-controlled territory in the latest book by Owen Lattimore, formerly adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Basing his summary on the reports of many independent observers, Lattimore lists these reasons for Communist success: (1) they have survived and expanded, "not because they subdue people by armed force, but because the people support them"; (2) "basic economic conditions are better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuomintang-controlled China"; (3) conscription and taxation are more equally distributed in Communist-controlled territory; (4) few of the many progressive, educated middle-class Chinese who voluntarily entered Communist territory have fled from it; and (5) "it is a fact that governing committees and representative committees are elected, and that the Communists limit themselves to one-third of the representation."

But, curiously, Lin made his choice without giving this big section of his own people a hearing. We may hope that it does not mark a permanent decision in his life as a writer and philosopher. He is, I believe, too honest and too wise, and fundamentally too decent a human being, to defend this indictment of his own people—once he realizes that such is the position in which he has placed himself. His own native skepticism will eventually compel him to reexamine the faulty case he has made out. Meanwhile, it is better to consider his book a temporary aberration induced by a difficulty common to many people who have lived too far from the terms of conflict, the difficulty of reconciling themselves to the social changes quickened by this war.

In the Wind

BETWEEN ATTACKS on the Administration, Representative Rankin of Mississippi adorns the pages of the *Congressional Record* with rhinestones like this (page A252, Appendix, January 23): "Glorious women of the South. Fashioned in Paradise, wreathed in graces and virtues that blossomed like flowers plucked from the green fields of Eden, led down to earth by angels along a pathway of stars, to be the joy, the blessing, the inspiration of noble men."

ADVERTISEMENT IN THE CHARLOTTE, North Carolina, *Observer* of February 3: "Stalin is on his way to Berlin. We are not going to Berlin. But! We are giving you McCorkle's Laundry and Cleaning Service."

FROM THE PARIS, TEXAS, *NEWS* of January 23: "Mount Pleasant, Texas.—A white man was placed under arrest here Wednesday by Sheriff Redfearn, who filed vagrancy charges against him. The man is purported to have called a meeting of Negroes for Wednesday night for the purpose of forming some sort of social-equality organization for Titus County, with membership fees to be charged. Although the organization is a legal one, recognized by both the federal and state governments, the arrest was made on the grounds that agitation for social equality would cause trouble here."

OUR HAT IS OFF to H. B. Fox, editor of the *Madisonville, Texas, Meteor and Times*, for his hard-hitting editorial in defense of Henry Wallace in the issue of February 1. First he quotes a number of editorials from big-city papers to the effect that Wallace has had no business experience. Then he points out that Wallace built up a three-million-dollar seed-corn business. And finally he says, "Although personal wealth is no gauge of any sort, is no prerequisite for criticism in any field, we'd really like to see a financial statement of all the editors of all the big dailies mentioned above. In fact, we'll bet a subscription to the *Meteor* against four subscriptions to all the papers mentioned above—practically an even bet—that Mr. Wallace handled ten times as much money last year as any of the editors, which wouldn't prove anything at all except the minor point of course that when it comes to the topic of Mr. Wallace the editors are either liars or ignoramuses."

FESTUNG EUROPA: A rule at the Grini concentration camp in Norway requires prisoners to "greet" all Germans, whether in uniform or in civilian clothes, in the following manner: at a distance of six paces the prisoner removes his cap; he marches past the German with head erect and eyes forward; three paces beyond the German he replaces his cap. . . . An editorial in the Oslo newspaper *Nationen* laments, "We who have accepted the Nazi policies expect to be shot sooner or later."

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*. We will pay \$1 for each item accepted.]

The Nazis' Next Twelve Years

BY HORST MENDERSHAUSEN

FOR Nazi Germany World War II has come to an end. It ended with von Rundstedt's unsuccessful attack in the Ardennes. His failure to break through to Antwerp marked the inability of the German army to regain the strategic initiative. The great break-through of the Russians in Poland and their sweep through Silesia and East Prussia revealed the extent of Germany's military inferiority to Allied power. The struggle for Berlin and north-central Germany now raging will take several weeks and so will the struggle for the lower Rhine and the Ruhr, but any protracted defense of northern Germany has become a military impossibility. A junction of the Russian and Anglo-American assault armies somewhere west of Berlin cannot be prevented for long, although it can be made a bloody task.

What then? For Germany to lose the industrial areas of Silesia and the Ruhr means inability to continue the war on the present scale. Its war machine will be deprived of its chief heavy-industry bases, especially of coal supplies. Germany will not be able to maintain panzer forces and air fleets adequate for mobile warfare in open country. The coming conquest of Berlin, Magdeburg, Hanover, and Leipzig will tear vital manufacturing centers out of the German system. These prospects raise hopes that the days of Nazi power are numbered, that military and political collapse will soon make German fascism a thing of the past, or at least a negligible quantity. Let us see to what extent such hopes are justified, and whether we have made sufficient allowance for wishful thinking.

Most of us believe that the military defeat of the German armies will lead (1) to surrender, (2) to Allied occupation of the Reich and disarmament of the Germans, (3) to the breakdown of the political power of the Nazis. Actually not one of these results can be expected with any certainty.

Will defeat lead to surrender? German soldiers, officers, and generals, individually or in groups, will give up and be taken prisoner. Some will even fight the S. S. for the right to surrender. The groups may be companies or even divisions. But will there be a surrender of Germany's armed forces as a whole? Such a surrender can be made only by the political leaders of Germany, that is, the Nazi leaders or somebody who steps into their place. The high command of the German army cannot effectively surrender unless it has gained political supremacy over Hitler, Himmler, and their aides. Generals can desert, they can keep their troops inactive, arrange for their capture, but they cannot make the whole army surrender unless they can arrest the Nazi leaders before they are arrested by them. It is probable that many German generals wish to surrender. The inevitability of complete military defeat in the current operations must be obvious to them. But their ability to force this decision on the political leaders or to deprive the Nazis of the political leadership is open to serious doubt.

There is no evidence that the Nazi leaders have ever thought or think now of throwing in the sponge and bowing to the victors. Last June they weathered an attempt on the part of army men to capture or kill Hitler and to dethrone the party. Hitler and Himmler asserted their power over the army leaders by removing, arresting, and killing "traitors." The purge has gone on right through the great Russian offensive. It will continue. The penetration of party men into the high command is accelerating. Non-party generals hold their commands on sufferance.

If the Nazi leaders cannot be talked into surrender, and if they cannot be removed by a coup d'état, surrender can be brought about only by the marshaling of a popular revolutionary force. Apparently the generals do not wish to rely on such a force. Even if they did, they would by now have a hard time finding it. The Nazis still hold political control to an unheard-of degree. They do not want to surrender, and they will not.

Will military defeat lead to the occupation and disarmament of Germany? Certainly the conquering armies will occupy the territory they are wresting from the enemy. But in the absence of general surrender, they will not occupy all of Germany at one stroke, to say nothing of Austria, Bohemia, and northern Italy. Instead, there will be fronts till the last large city is taken, and there will be a Nazi *maquis* even after that.

We have become painfully aware of the probability of a German *maquis*. The Nazis are organizing it with all their thoroughness. They have studied as well as fought the French *maquis*, the Russian and Balkan partisans. In the last issue of *The Nation* Alfred Kantorowicz asserted that instead of carrying on resistance through an armed underground the Nazis would feign collaboration with the Allies until the withdrawal of the occupation forces—that is, follow the strategy of Mihailovich rather than of Tito. I believe they will attempt both, according to time and circumstance. Some of their clandestine units will merely meet and train in cellars and woods, commit *Felme* murders, and keep out of sight. Others will openly defend a suitable area against Allied or German forces. Still others will attack trains, supply centers, villages, and towns, kill anti-Nazis, take hostages, and perhaps occupy new territory. Only under stable political conditions can they be expected to lie low for long or to disintegrate. To assume otherwise is to credit them with less daring, stamina, and determination than the Yugoslav partisans and the French resistance forces.

While we tend to underestimate the political danger of the Nazi underground, we are right in not granting it much military importance. After all, the Germans held their centers and communication lines in France and the Balkans with minor occupation forces. We should not, however, underrate the strength of German military resistance after the fall of Ber-

lin and the Ruhr. Where will the stand be made? It is apparent from recent Nazi moves that the nucleus of open resistance will be in southern Germany. Berchtesgaden, to which ministries and records are being removed, is the symbolic center. But Hitler's mountain fastness has other advantages. There are industrial bases in Thuringia, Austria, Bohemia, and Bavaria—chemical and metallurgical industries, iron mines, and oil supplies. All of them together cannot replace the Ruhr, Silesia, the Berlin area, and north-central Germany. They cannot support prolonged defense against such assaults as the Russians and we are capable of. But together with sizable stores of arms and supplies, they can feed a war of slow retreat, of stubborn defense interrupted by withdrawals. The fronts will be in the mountains of central Germany receding to the Main, in the Black Forest, in the Sudeten mountains and the hill country of Bohemia, perhaps in the Bohemian forest after the Russians have forced their way to Pilsen; later in the Austrian Alps. Under attack the fronts will recede and converge, the territory held by the Nazis will contract. But unless each front is attacked by large forces it will exist for many months. Our experience in Italy indicates how long the Germany may hold out in territory favorable to defense if no overwhelming force is thrown against them.

Will the Allies be ready to employ overwhelming forces to drive the Nazis out of their mountain strongholds? Or will they consider such operations of small importance, to be carried through at the rate of the war in Italy? After Berlin and the first-class industrial areas of the north are conquered, will they settle down to a war of attrition? The answers to these questions will determine the duration of the German war. They depend in turn upon political developments in Germany.

Will military defeat bring the political breakdown of the Nazis? It is as true today as it was in 1939 that Nazism cannot be destroyed until its military forces are completely defeated. Yet its political débâcle is not insured by military defeat. If it were, we should by now see the political effect of Stalingrad, the loss of the Ukraine, the defeats in France, Poland, and eastern Germany. The German people do not hope to win this war, to drive the Russians back to the Curzon line and the Western Allies into the sea. Nazi propaganda does not veil the dismal prospect. But the despair of the people, while a prerequisite to the overthrow of the Nazi regime, will not bring it about unless the people have the vision of an alternative way of living. Such a vision is lacking.

The Nazi leaders find widespread belief when they say that surrender in this war means the end of the German nation, the physical destruction of the German people, the razing of their industries, enslavement, "Siberia." They have been assisted in their propaganda by our inability to devise anything as attractive as Wilson's Fourteen Points. Worse, the German anti-Hitler forces have not been able to give the people a vision of a post-Hitler Germany that can live or to provide an organization that can create it.

The situation differs radically from 1918. There are as yet no new political guiding principles, agreeable to the victors, that would enable the Germans to put their house in order and to rally for meaningful tasks and a productive

role in the world. There is nothing that promises survival to a most highly organized and industrialized people. Western notions of economic and social organization appear to Germans hypocritical and unworkable—at best a fair dream of days gone by. The ideal of liberal capitalism seems anachronistic in an age of corporate empires, cartels, and planned economies; professions of political democracy and international law are questioned for their meaning and sincerity. The ambivalent concepts of conservative nations pragmatically groping for readjustment and gradual social change make little appeal to a people that has been caught in a revolutionary storm since 1933.

Soviet ideas seem more workable, especially to labor and the intelligentsia, but there is little hope that Germany could apply them to its own benefit. Giving in to Russian ideology means Russian rule. The Free Germany Committee is the most effective propaganda instrument used by the Allies; and there is the German Communist Party. But it is doubtful whether these agents can do more than drive wedges into the German people. There is no immediate prospect of their gathering a substantial number of political activists, uniting the German people in revolt and doing at least as effective an ideological job as the Social Democrats did in 1918. They still have to point the way convincingly toward a free, unexploited Germany; they must prove they are not Russian stooges.

Undeniably the political power of the Nazis has survived the shattering military defeats they have experienced. It is evident in the stubborn defense on some fighting fronts, in sabotage and espionage in conquered territory, in intimidation of sincere German collaborators and *Felbme* murders, in the maintenance of order despite terrific bombing and streams of refugees.

Nazi post-war policy. Is this a senseless, suicidal struggle? It may turn out to be, but for the present it is a highly deliberate, cold-blooded policy. It is not merely the last fight of a gang of criminals cornered by the police. The military and political policy of the Nazis has entered the post-war stage. It is directed toward victory in a new phase of the international civil war.

The pattern of the Nazis' post-war policy can be seen in their actions, their propaganda, and their philosophy. They firmly believe that the victorious United Nations cannot pacify and organize Germany—or Europe. The Allies, they think, will threaten and appease; they will be unable to cope with the German political reality; they will fall out among themselves over differences in objectives and methods. German anti-Nazis will be weak, not only because of the holocaust they went through, but because of their confusion and the inability of the Allied powers to agree upon groups to be favored. The Nazis expect the Allied authorities to waste their German collaborators, to discredit them by demanding that they suppress spontaneous political activity, especially among the workers in the western districts, or by forcing them to carry out punitive tasks, mobilize a labor army for Russia, make work in Germany even less attractive than work in Russia. With the country in a state of political chaos, increased by the barriers between the occupation zones, the Nazis count on an equally chaotic state of production and transportation.

National Socialism will remain the only symbol of national unity, social equity, and organizational efficiency.

In this hell the Allies will work at cross-purposes and in mutual suspicion. They will grow occupation sick; civil war will break out within and between their zones of occupation. The Nazis will operate in such a setting as underground organizers, as "experts" and "collaborators," as saboteurs and *Felme* judges. They will exploit discords among the Allies and present themselves as the only force capable of making order, perhaps as true anti-Bolsheviks in one place and true pro-Russians in another. Outside Germany they will attempt to build centers of organization and finance to feed the civil war in Germany and to exploit political conflicts, national and international, all over the world. They will appear as journalists, traders, research workers, and brothel keepers. And they will receive support from native fascists.

These Nazi calculations are far too realistic to be laughed out of court. Thanks to their greater experience in such matters the Russians are likely to combat the Nazi underground more effectively than the British or Americans. But a confused and deadly struggle may develop within the Free Germany Committee and similar bodies between Nazi converts and Nazi stooges. Any German force of national and socialist integrity will be in constant danger of being denounced, torn apart, or crushed by the Russians, the Nazis, the Western Allies, or all of them.

The current war and propaganda strategy of the Nazis fits these expectations. One thing they want to avoid at all cost is surrender under the direction of the Nazi Party. That would destroy their claims to political leadership more effectively than anything else they could do. Hitler propaganda hammers home: there must be no repetition of 1918; surrender means the death of the nation. His military strategy is that of continuing war, war that ends never and nowhere. Obviously, such warfare is meaningless, futile, according to the standards of limited, sportsmanlike war. But it has an economy all its own, from the saving of arms to the mass forging of identities of Nazi functionaries, from scorched-earth policy to suicidal, spectacular military action. It includes the building of a war chest abroad, now proceeding via exports of valuables to Switzerland, Spain, and Argentina.

This new warfare presents the Allied nations with a tremendous task. They cannot enjoy the fruits of victory unless they can defeat the political challenge of fascism. The military defeat of the German armies without surrender and political breakdown will prove that this war can be won only if we fight it as a purge of humanity from fascism. Otherwise it will be a permanent war.

Far-reaching conclusions are to be drawn from these facts. We must pursue the war relentlessly till we obtain the complete destruction of the Nazis' armed forces. To foil the Nazi post-war strategy we must lift it off its political hinges. The main source of the Nazi threat is Nazism's political hold on the people. There must be an effective German counterforce with reasonable freedom of action and with a national and social outlook that fits the experiences and ambitions of the German people. Such a force may begin to gather in the final stages of the fighting or the early stages of occupation.

The earlier it appears and the more it contributes to the fall of this town or the smashing of that S. S. unit the better its political chances. Only Germans will be able to carry through the colossal job of sorting out the sheep from the wolves in sheep's clothing, of encouraging the former and punishing the latter, of making converts, of establishing an order that is not Nazi order.

We need Allied statesmanship which will permit the formation of such a force in the framework of general, realistic cooperation among the Allied powers. Some of the recent AMG policies are very unwise and should be changed. For one thing, the AMG cannot go on suppressing the political activity of workers, as announced in its message to German civilians of December 15, 1944, without feeding fresh energies into the Nazi organization. It cannot afford to drive the anti-Nazis underground. It cannot afford to tolerate Nazis in office even where military expediency does not compel its officers to give in to popular demands for their removal.

And since the new war of the Nazis is an international civil war, we must not forget what is going on in neutral countries and right here at home. Our diplomats and the FBI should be watchful and aggressive. They have to crush the heads of the hydra. To starve its body, we must steer free from economic depression and social crisis that would foster foreign aggression and encourage alliances with the master-racers. The Nazis are teaching us the scope of this war in time and space. To defeat them we must learn the lesson.

Secret Diplomacy

A SECRET CLAUSE in the Italian armistice agreement which reserves certain rights to the House of Savoy caused the Socialist Party to withdraw voluntarily from the Bonomi government, according to a sensational accusation made by a representative of the Italian Socialist Party, Signor Buffoni, at an international Socialist conference in France. During the first phase of liberation the House of Savoy tactfully avoided making use of this clause. But now that it feels more secure, it insists on its strict application. This was shown during the last Cabinet crisis, when the Lord Lieutenant of the Realm, Prince Umberto, insisted on his full sovereign rights.

Open Diplomacy

SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES are determined to discuss Fascist activities in the Western Hemisphere thoroughly and openly at the coming meeting of Foreign Ministers in Mexico City. They have therefore suggested that a special committee be appointed to deal with this vital subject. Latin Americans feel that the mere exclusion of Argentina from the conference does not settle the highly complex problem of Nazi and Falangist infiltration. They wish to eradicate fascism from Argentina; but they also wish to stamp it out in every country where it has taken root. If the projected Committee on Fascist Activities materializes, the debates of the conference will not lack sensational revelations.

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

NOTES BY THE WAY

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

BY CHANCE I got hold of a copy of "The Unquiet Grave," a book published in a limited edition by *Horizon*, the English literary monthly. It is identified as A Word Cycle by Palinurus, but I think that any reader of *Horizon* would recognize in its pages the style and temperament of the editor, Cyril Connolly. "The Unquiet Grave," to quote the jacket, "describes a year's journey through the mind of a writer who is haunted by the turbulent Mediterranean figure of Palinurus, the drowned pilot, whose uneasy ghost demands to be placated." It might also be described as the journal of a modern man who midway in the path of life found himself in a dark wood and sought to write his way out.

The book consists of three extended series of notations—statement, confession, reminiscence and evocation, regret, resolution, and epigram, including many quotations from the masters of Connolly's particular and personal choice. There is, finally, a rueful Epilogue in which the author studies "the Psychiatrist's confidential report" on Palinurus.

It is extraordinarily good reading, this "self-dismantling" of an intelligent, pleasure-loving, volatile, dismayed, but irrepressible spirit tossing in the unquiet grave of the modern world, for it speaks to all the moods, high and low, expansive and trivial, of other tossers. There are not many patently "cheerful thoughts" in Mr. Connolly's calendar, yet the end effect of this witty, penetrating, and often lyrical record of his attitudes toward art, love, nature, and religion is that of purgation, which can be very exhilarating. Even misery, in good company, can yield a bitter sweet of gaiety.

Connolly's selected masterpieces, which infuse the air he lives by, are, as he says, mostly high peaks of the secondary range—masterpieces which "contain the maximum of emotion compatible with a classical sense of form," such as the Odes and Epistles of Horace, the Eclogues and Georgics of Vergil, the Testament of Villon, the Essays of Montaigne, the Fables of La Fontaine, the Maxims of La Rochefoucauld and La Bruyère, the "Fleurs du Mal" and Intimate Journals of Baudelaire, the poems of Pope and Leopardi, the Illuminations of Rimbaud, and Byron's "Don Juan." He does not include Pascal in his list, though he frequently invokes him. "We can deduce," he writes, "that the compiler of this list should set himself to write after these models. Even though none of the conditions for producing a masterpiece be present, he can at least attempt to work at the same level of intention. . . ."

He has made a good try, and in his *pensées* he has spared himself least of all. By rights he should now be on the plain of Purgatorio ready to ascend the mount.

MR. CONNOLLY SUFFERS, among other things, from the ordeal of being a civilian in war time. Not to be involved, or to be only indirectly involved, in the prevailing

condition of man, whatever one's opinion of that condition, is painful and frustrating. (That is at least one reason why the civilian has such a conscience about the G. I. Conversely, when the condition shifts to peace, his feeling of responsibility becomes much less acute if it doesn't disappear altogether.)

To have been in London since 1939 is not exactly to have been a noncombatant. Or a combatant either; there's the rub. In *Horizon* some months ago, Civilian, who sounds very much like Connolly, wrote a bitterly humorous letter to "Dear Victor" in the service, in which he gave vent to civilian "beefs":

. . . you raced through to Benghazi and back, while we pushed our way through broken glass and craters in the blackout and lay awake through those nights of the blitz in our huge dentist's waiting-room.

Of course all this time you had to fight. Don't think I am unaware of all this fighting; it is just that which churns the guilt round and round till it curdles into a kind of rancorous despair. You are always fighting for me, . . . Oh, why can't I fight for myself?

I know one is not supposed to say so, but I don't like flying bombs; . . . they are the final appointment in the dentist's chair, and, casualties apart, they have made London more dirty, more unsociable, more plague-stricken than ever. The civilians who remain grow more and more hunted and disagreeable. . . .

. . . shroud your future movements on French soil in military secrecy. You may liberate Europe, but you can't liberate me.

The advantage, forgetting for a moment the terrible disadvantages, of the person who is actively involved was carried home to me with great force when, a couple of weeks ago, I met three of the eight French journalists who are visiting this country. I hadn't met anyone from the French underground before. The three individuals—Mme Viollis, M. Lombard, and M. Jean-Paul Sartre—could hardly be more different from one another; what they had in common, and what set them apart from everyone else in the room, French or American, was a concentration of personality, so to speak, of feeling, intellect, and attention, which was clearly the result of their experience. Perhaps because they are French, they were quite free of the unpleasant fanaticism of the dedicated. They were humorous and gracious. But they also had the temper and edge of Toledo blades. One felt that every shred of complacency, deadness, dilettantism, whether of politics or art or life, had been burned away. At this moment Europe may be said to be composed of such tempered men and women, whatever their walk of life. But the finest steel gets dull quickly. Let's hope that in spite of the blunting, self-interested maneuvers of the State Department, the British Foreign Office, and the Kremlin the people of Europe will force through the necessary social changes before they relapse into a post-war state of weariness and slackened will.

I asked M. Sartre about Jean Bruller, also known as Vercors and Desvignes. He was indignant when I told him that "Silence of the Sea" had been suspected here of having

a collaborationist tinge. That charge, he said sternly, was disproved by the very fact that the book was published by Les Editions de Minuit, an underground press. He went on to say that the author had deliberately chosen to portray the "correct" Nazi in that book in order to make it crystal clear that the Frenchman would not and could not make peace even with the best of the "master race."

M. Lombard, who has a lean, ruddy Western American look, might easily be taken for the editor of the only liberal newspaper in Montana—which is in itself something of an underground activity, since there's seldom more than one extant and it's always on the point of being put out of business by the powers that be.

THE CITY OF KOENIGSBERG is much in the news these days. It is often cited as the birthplace of Prussianism and the capital of the Junkers. Joseph Bornstein has sent me a few paragraphs about Königsberg's other claim to fame, which should not be forgotten.

Few people seem to remember that Königsberg was also the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant and once the capital of very progressive ideas.

In Königsberg just 150 years ago Kant published a small book entitled "Zum Ewigen Frieden" or "Perpetual Peace." In it the author of the "Critique of Pure Reason" suggested that the nations should form "a special sort of alliance, what might be called a League of Peace." Although some critics, among them the famous Herder, objected that Kant's ideas were not very original, were indeed old stuff, "Perpetual Peace" became a best-seller in 1795. The first edition was sold out within a few weeks, and French, Danish, and English translations were published shortly afterward. Since that time no one has studied the problem of international security without discovering that the essential points had been considered as far back as 1795, in Königsberg.

"A true policy," wrote Kant, "will not take a step without first paying its homage to morality. United to morals, politics is no longer a difficult and complicated art; morality cuts the knot that policy is unable to untie. . . . We cannot divide ourselves between right and expediency. Policy must bow the knee before morality."

Prussianism and the power of the Junkers are perishing in disgrace; these other ideas from Königsberg are still alive—at least in the aspect of a dream that repeats itself again and again. Kant himself was no dreamer. The face of the world in the one hundred and fiftieth year after the publication of "Perpetual Peace" would hardly surprise him. In one of his essays Kant pointed out that mankind might not be able to learn from experience, that relations between nations might therefore remain as they have always been, and that, in the end, the natural inclinations of the human race might "prepare for us a hell of evils in the midst of a state of highest civilization, destroying this state and all cultural progress by barbaric devastations."

But whether or not perpetual peace is possible, the philosopher of Königsberg maintained, the "moral-practical reason" requires that man should labor constantly toward this end. "It is," he wrote, "our duty."

A REFUGEE SEEKING CITIZENSHIP was asked to define the meaning of American liberty. He hesitated, as even a citizen might, and then replied, "Free enterprise." I'm not surprised. Every public performance these days—right, left, and center—seems to open and close with that magic phrase, "free enterprise."

Concerning the Devil

THE DEVIL'S SHARE. By Denis de Rougemont. Pantheon Books. \$2.50.

THIS profound study of the reality and complexity of evil in human history was first published in French and is now presented in the English translation. Its thesis is an elaboration of the words of Baudelaire: "It is the devil's cleverest wile to convince us that he does not exist." In expounding this dictum De Rougemont is able not only to track down the general human trait of self-righteousness but to refute the tendency of modern culture to attribute evil in human life merely to ignorance, sickness, social maladjustment, or what not. De Rougemont believes that man has the capacity, because he has the freedom, to corrupt every virtue and to make any achievement the occasion for a new evil. The devil, he declares on scriptural authority, is legion. One way of obscuring the evil in us is to attribute it to natural necessity, when in fact it arises in the rational freedom of man. Another way is to find it embodied in a particular form in the enemy and therefore assume that it cannot be in us. Thus Hitler has contributed to illusions about evil in history because the depth of evil which he incarnated tempted us to believe that evil was inhuman.

"Hitler," declares De Rougemont, "was not outside humanity but within it. He was in us before he was against us. It is in ourselves that he rose up against us. And once he is dead he will occupy us without striking a blow if we do not admit that he is a part of us, the devil's part in our hearts." One need only consider the ubiquity of evils which arise from the impulse of domination and the various forms of racial and national pride which corrupt the democratic world to recognize the validity of this analysis.

De Rougemont does not, however, make the mistake of assuming that evil is equally embodied in all nations, classes, or individuals or that recognition of the internal and general character of potential evil makes it unnecessary to fight against the more flagrant forms of actualized evil. "If I resemble the criminal," he declares, "this does not justify the criminal but condemns me. . . . I will not let yonder criminal remain at large in order to give myself over to inner reforms." His doctrine is in short no quietistic escape from political and social tasks.

Many observers have called attention to the incipient forms of Nazism which are revealed in the democratic or civilized world in the impulse of imperialism and the pride of race, class, and nation. De Rougemont carries this analysis one step farther and proves that these social and political evils have their root in impulses of which no individual is wholly free.

Some modern readers will fail to profit by the author's profound analysis of the general sources of evil in human history and of the multifarious forms which it may take, because they will be affronted by the poetic and mythical symbols which he uses. But if they follow his logic they may find that these poetic symbols are practically essential tools of his analysis. If evil is thought of merely as cultural lag or natural inertia, these symbols are not necessary. But if we recognize historical evil as a corruption of human freedom, and not merely as some natural sloth which retards

February 17, 1945

freedom, it will become apparent that the "devil" is a meaningful symbol. The devil is a fallen angel, a corruption of something good; and the corruption is caused by an excess rather than a defect of some particular vitality of life.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

BRIEFER COMMENT

American Social History

JOHN ALLEN KROUT and the late Dixon Ryan Fox, in "The Completion of Independence, 1790-1830" (Macmillan, \$4), have written skilfully and entertainingly of the social history of the first forty years of the Republic. This volume completes the History of American Life series (twelve volumes, \$30) the first four volumes of which appeared eighteen years ago. Under the editorial guidance of Drs. Schlesinger and Fox, and of Carl Becker, who served as consulting editor, this series has become an important landmark in American historiography. The twelve volumes, written by competent historical scholars, nearly all of whom have added to their previous reputation by their contribution to this series, are especially notable for the first satisfactory synthesis of social history, the intelligent use and discussion of illustrations, and the completeness of their bibliographies.


"The Completion of Independence" is one of the better volumes in this series. In 1790 we had established political independence and achieved a new form of government which has stood the test of time. The intellectual leaders of the era realized that that was not enough. They also had to establish cultural and economic independence. Dr. Benjamin Rush commented that the Revolution was not over; Noah Webster urged his countrymen to "unshackle your minds, and act like independent beings. . . . You have now an interest of your own to augment and defend. . . ." Largely ignoring conventional political history, this volume offers the best account we have of the manner in which Americans began the completion of their independence. Farmers and storekeepers, doctors and clergymen, factory hands and sea captains, frontiersmen and authors—these are the people whose way of living fills these pages. Andrew Jackson receives less attention than Jedidiah Morse; Jefferson's views on education get more space than the War of 1812. This book is marked by skilful synthesis, careful scholarship, and a style which varies from competent to brilliant. As with the entire series, this is an important contribution both to the better writing and teaching of American history and to its intelligent enjoyment by the layman.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

Economic Fundamentalism

PROFESSOR EDWIN W. KEMMERER has delivered yet another sermon denouncing original monetary sin—deliberate currency depreciation—and calling on the nations to repent and return to the simple economic virtues of the Victorian era. In "Gold and the Gold Standard" (McGraw-Hill, \$2.50) he reviews the use of gold as money through the ages, noting sorrowfully the perennial disposition of governments to tamper with the coinage. As early as the fourth

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century B. C. he finds "a case of monetary debasement suggestive of our American debasement of 1933 to 1934."

Unfortunately, like most preachers, Professor Kemmerer has been content to castigate depravity as depravity and has not troubled to inquire why depreciation, like fornication, has been practiced throughout history as consistently as it has been deplored. Is the reason, perhaps, a fundamental antagonism between a monetary system based on a sporadic supply of precious metals and the monetary needs of a gradually expanding economy? Is there a connection between the historical tendency to depreciate and the desire to escape from the tyranny of compound interest?

For Professor Kemmerer the real Golden Age was the period from 1821 to 1914, during which Britain maintained the full gold standard and the leading countries of the world one by one followed its example. Certainly, this was a period of rapid economic progress; it was also an era of successive discoveries of new gold fields. Without the resultant constant addition to the metallic base of the currency, it seems more than probable either that progress would have been severely checked or that the gold standard would have been overthrown. In the seventies and eighties there was both a slackening in world gold production and a serious deflation of prices. The United States, a new adherent to the gold standard, very nearly abandoned it under pressure from producers of primary commodities. Probably it was only the discovery of the Rand that saved the day and kept Bryan out of the White House.

If Professor Kemmerer wants to restore and maintain the gold standard, he must arrange for a steadily increasing supply of the metal. Providence hasn't been very helpful in this respect, but perhaps the scientists with their atomic alchemies will provide a solution. Unfortunately, however, that might well cause gold to become so common that it would cease to symbolize virtue.

KEITH HUTCHISON

The Great Crusade

JUST AS FRANCES WILLARD was being edged out of her job as dean of the Woman's College of Northwestern University by male members of the faculty who thought her too "uppity," a band of determined women marched down the main street of Hillsboro, Ohio, headed for John's Saloon. In the group were the wives and daughters of the best families of Hillsboro. The time was December, 1873, and the ladies were about to pray, not drink, John out of business.

This was the beginning of the "crusade" which spread so quickly across the prairies that *The Nation* of March 19, 1874, reported that in the eleven internal-revenue districts of Ohio and Indiana the movement had caused a falling off in receipts for January and February of that year of more than \$350,000.

Dean Willard did not take part in the original crusade; but like the war horses in the Bible she could smell a battle from afar, and when the temperance sentiment stirred up by the crusade was organized into the Women's National Christian Temperance Union at a Cleveland convention in November, 1874, Miss Willard joined up. Five years later she was elected president of what was to become under her militant leadership easily the most powerful national and



international organization of women the world had yet seen.

The story of her career is set forth in "Frances Willard, from Prayers to Politics" by Mary Earhart (University of Chicago Press, \$3.75), and it makes fascinating reading. Under her slogan of "Gospel politics" she took the temperance movement into the dusty arena of third-party politics, worked for a while with the Prohibition Party, went along with the Knights of Labor in their semi-mystical program of temperance, cooperation, trade-union organization, and agitation for the eight-hour day, mesmerized some pretty tough labor leaders into bewildered support of her campaign for sex purity, and always and always worked for suffrage. At one time or another this eloquent, often witty, undeniably charming woman went in for Christian and Fabian socialism, transcendentalism, theosophy, phrenology, and vegetarianism, in addition to her chief interests—temperance, suffrage, and equal rights.

Miss Earhart, a member of the faculty of political science at Northwestern, has done a man-sized (oops, sorry, a woman-sized) job in bringing together these diverse pigments for a sympathetic portrait of an awe-inspiring personality.

MC ALISTER COLEMAN

Latin America—Long-Range View

SHORTLY AFTER THE RECOGNITION of the Soviet Union by the United States a Russian economist, then famous, was discussing the future of this country with a group of American liberals. The Russian had little faith in the ability of the United States to avoid a not very distant catastrophe. Pressed as to whether there was any solution, he thought for a moment and replied, "There is, but you won't take it—the industrialization of Latin America."

"Latin America in the Future World," by George Soule, David Efron, and Norman T. Ness (Farrar and Rinehart, \$3.50), recalls that occasion. This is a solid, cooperative effort toward the definition and possible solution of the economic problems of Latin America. It is a thoroughly competent piece of work, as authoritative for the Southern Hemisphere as a whole as Felix Weil's recent book was for the Argentine. It is, perhaps, hardly an entertaining book, though its unencumbered precision and square-standing judgments quite remove it from the category of academic exercise. It contains three parts, of which the first is a documented analysis of the basic problem. Colonial economy and the large-scale ownership of land, inherited from imperial days, have led to appalling poverty and backwardness. Part II studies the effect of the war on this situation, and the final and briefest section contains a review of recommended policies, not exclusively as they concern the United States. Nevertheless, it is clearly understood that the desired industrialization must be brought about in cooperation with North American financial institutions under public control. There is no serious attempt to estimate whether the Soviet economist's negative prophecy will be borne out. Nor does the book estimate the immediacy of the returns upon the policies it suggests. Its utility is perhaps of two sorts: it is a rich storehouse of facts about Latin American society, and it gives a mature, long-range historical view of the problem of hemisphere relations.

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JAMES
AGEE

NEVER having read the novel, I can consider "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" only in its movie version. I think it a more interesting and likable movie than most. It concentrates on poverty, on some crucial aspects of early puberty, on domestic relationships, and on life in a big city, which are rarely undertaken on the American screen, with considerable enthusiasm, tenderness, discipline, and intelligence. It even presents and accepts the idea, unpopular enough even in contemporary fiction, that some antagonisms and inadequacies are too deeply rooted to be wholly explicable or curable. It also develops its main love interest between a little girl and her father, and it presents a drunkard, the father, for once without moralizing about him or reforming him. (The agencies concerned about this are doubtless satisfied with his death.) The film is so interested in taking its proper time, with and between each scene, that a number of important scenes had, I infer, to be dropped for length; I don't otherwise understand such a thing as the barely illustrated relationship between mother and son, in a screen play so obviously careful—not to mention the virtual absence of the symbolic tree of the title, which could have been accounted for in about three extra shots.

The tenement sets and city streets of the movie are as lovingly and exhaustively detailed and as solid-looking as any I can remember. Most of the players, like those in the same studio's "Ox-Bow Incident," clearly believed they had special duties, opportunities, and privileges. I was especially moved and impressed by James Dunn as the father and by the ways, visible and sometimes stammering though they were, in which Peggy Ann Garner and the director Elia Kazan handled what I take to be her rigidity as an actress, turning it into a part of her personal and visual charm, and of the role she is in those respects so well suited for. "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" also contains single moments or shots so extraordinarily good that they make me wonder why the rest, granted the same eye that made or saved these, need have fallen short. There is a shot of the girl hesitant on a curb which has the lovely authenticity of a wild animal startled by a flashbulb—or of the same shot made by a concealed camera

in a real street. There is a shot of Dunn, ghastly drunk in his inky waiter's suit, so painfully malappropriate to daylight, being shoved and shouted along his home street, which is as poetic and individualized an image of a state beneath humiliation as I have seen. There is a shot of Joan Blondell's bent hustling back, the thin dress propped and ridged through her underwear, as she goes in to help deliver her sister of a baby, which is equally successful in its evocation of women in a special and final class and world and predicament.

Yet "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" is as much a disappointment—even an annoyance—as a pleasure. My heart goes out to the people who reproduced the Brooklyn streets—I could probably lose every other interest in life in the love for just such detail—but try as they will, they only prove, more convincingly because more masterfully than I have seen it proved before, that the best you can do in that way is as dead as an inch-by-inch description or a perfectly naturalistic painting, compared with accepting instead the still scarcely imagined difficulties and the enormous advantages of submerging your actors in the real thing, full of its irreducible present tense and its unpredictable proliferations of energy and beauty. I regret too that with sets even as good as they had they gave only token shots of the city for its own sake, free from the advancement of the plot or the complications of a character; what a wonderful chance they missed to take fifteen or twenty minutes' vacation from the story for, say, the free-gliding, picaresque, and perfect eye for a Saturday schoolchild's cruising of the city. I'm afraid too that they were too calculated in their use of offscreen noise and music, and in those scenes for which there were no accidental offscreen noises.

For the rest, trusting what friends who have also seen the film tell me of the novel, one must be dubious of both, if not with such full hatred, still with some of the same distaste which is inspired by an advertising artist's use of everything that was sweated out from Cézanne on. Ever since certain kinds of sexual sophistication began to qualify for the big-money market in "Anthony Adverse"—very likely it began before that—I have been bothered by how easy it was, cynically or in Miss Smith's case I would believe innocently, to make palatable to the irredeemable enemies of all courage and adventurous perception matters which they had helped crush more original artists and scientists for

Art

CLEMENT
GREENBERG

daring, however unprofitably, to take notice of. "A Tree Grows in Brooklyn" is "realistic" in a way which would have been loathed by the people who will now accept it if they had lived even a short while ago; and if a measure of its still fundamental cautiousness is needed, you can be sure they would still loathe "Greed," for with all its own faults "Greed" never in the least degree tempered its wind to any part of its public.

"The Tree's" attention to poverty and need, though frank as such things go in films, is also temperate compared with the staring facts of poverty and need; the comfortable have always been able to lick their chops over the hunger of others if that hunger is presented with the right sort of humorous or pathetic charm; if certain Christian or Marxian glands are tactfully enough stimulated, they will drool as well. The father-daughter, mother-son relationships in the movie follow a classic Freudian pattern and for once make no phony scientific capital of the fact, but I found the classicism even more pat than it sometimes looks in Freud, and a lot more safely dressed up. The characters themselves bother me most, but here I have an even harder time defining my mistrust of them. It is, roughly, that the imagination has been used a little too glibly to blow up and trim off the presumptive originals of these characters into very comfortably readable,actable, easily understandable creatures, whose faults and virtues are all tagged or neatly braided. I don't forget mentioning that within themselves and in their relationships they are more complex and intransigent than is usual now—and far less vulgarly designed to expound some sociological or political or psychological doctrine. But even this, the respectable beginning at least of a return toward trying to represent human existence, can be so handled as to make it one more asset of a piece of fool-proof entertainment—like those novels whose authors go through half the pockets of the astounded Christian world merely by writing a few hundred pages house-breaking ten lion-like words from the New Testament.

For reasons such as these—or because, like me, they have automatically neglected to read a best-seller—I won't wonder if a good many intelligent people pass up this movie or, even if they see it, dismiss it. For all I regret or dislike about it, I don't think it is to be dismissed.

IT HAS been my feeling that the basis of Morris Graves's art would not be sufficient to carry it beyond its first impulse. In the first place, nature worship can furnish but scanty and rather irrelevant material in these times—when the main and inescapable problem is urban life; in the second place, gouache on thin paper can do only so much in any one artist's hands; in the third place, the tradition in which Graves works—Chinese painting and Klee—is too narrow and too far removed from the main stream. It was large enough for him to demonstrate that he was talented and original to begin with; but once the demonstration was made there was no place left to go.

Graves's art already began to hesitate several years ago as it eked out its first substance with a strong dosage of Klee. In his latest show at the Willard Gallery (through February 24) it manifests what is almost a collapse. His new *kakemonos*, which are paintings vertical

in design and "mounted on scrolls," either are too derivative of Oriental art or waver awkwardly between decoration and easel-painting. Not enough plastic material is present to indicate, much less fulfil, his intentions—not enough tone, not enough compositional elements. The same poverty weakens his framed gouaches. Graves is subtle—he has to be within the narrow limits set for himself—but subtlety is of no avail when it has to deal with matter so evanescent as hardly to attain the status of the visible. Something very spontaneous, very valid, moves at the bottom of his art, but for the present it does not materialize as anything much more than an impulse, an initial impulse—sometimes only the demi-semi-quaver of an impulse.

Modern experience sets the bounds within which modern art must be practiced. These bounds are considerably wider than those of Graves's painting, but wide as they may be, relatively, they have, since the death of Klee, excluded birds, fishes, and trees. For all its emphasis on inwardness, Graves's eye is not really inward enough; if it were, it would be a *positive eye* that saw through and beyond pantheism.

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THE ARTS IN REVIEW

By JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH, JAMES AGEE
CLEMENT GREENBERG, B. H. HAGGIN

Music

B. H.
HAGGIN

WHILE Lehmann was singing Beethoven's "An die ferne Geliebte" cycle at a concert of the New Friends of Music, I was listening to Toscanini's performance of Berlioz's "Queen Mab" in Studio 8H. No music has in this studio the normal sound that it has in the concert hall; but nothing I have heard has been altered as much and as harmfully as Berlioz's magical scherzo. To avoid the harsh reverberance of the sound on the main floor I sat in the balcony; but there the piece was deprived of much of its evocative effect by the dry, toneless distinctness of the sound, the lack of splendor at the climaxes. N. B. C. may claim the performance had the right sound and effect as it came out of the radios in homes; but the performance of the piece which I heard from my radio last spring sounded only better, not wholly right. From the beginning of Toscanini's broadcasts N. B. C. has contended that what was wrong with the sound in Studio 8H was necessary to make it right for the ears of radio listeners; but that certainly was not true in the first years, when the radio brought into one's home the dry, unresonant sound that had been picked up in the acoustically dead studio; nor has it been true since the change to liveness and reverberance

in the studio, which has made a tremendous improvement in the sound from the radio. That sound would be even better without the studio's present harshness; and the best orchestral sound from a radio is the one that is the best at its place of origin—the normal sound of the orchestra in a concert hall. I am sure that a broadcast performance of Berlioz's "Queen Mab" picked up from Carnegie Hall would sound wholly right.

Provided, of course, that it was transmitted properly. Two years ago I heard the all-important balances which Toscanini had labored to create in the performance of Debussy's "La Mer" altered in transmission. Last year a number of broadcasts were afflicted by distortion in the sounds of high pitch, which an engineer I know, with sharp ears for musical sound in addition to his technical knowledge, thought was caused by defective transmitting apparatus. This year I have listened to the performances in the studio; but he has reported to me that the few broadcasts he has heard have sounded dull, unbalanced, and unclear, and that filter tests have shown that the standard broadcasts of the concerts were being sent out with their frequency-range reduced from the 11,000 cycles that is the limit of the transmitting equipment to something around 6,000. He has found this to be true of other N. B. C. programs, such as the celebrated Telephone Hour—which has made it look like policy rather than accident. In this connection he has recalled an article in *Electronics* of last August, in which O. B. Hansen, N. B. C.'s vice-president in charge of engineering, talked about what was theoretically possible in high fidelity and what was practically attainable and desirable, and reached the conclusion that much less was practically attainable and desirable than was theoretically possible. And Hansen, my engineer friend speculates, may be proving with the reduced range of N. B. C.'s broadcasts that even a frequency range of 6,000 cycles is satisfactory to the public; hence that the 10,000 attainable by standard broadcasting is all that is needed; and—only by implication, of course—that the 20,000 offered by Frequency Modulation broadcasting is not needed. Not, he agrees, that N. B. C. can have any hope of eliminating FM broadcasting; but that it can try to eliminate the possibility of competition from new post-war FM chains.

P. S.: My engineer friend reports that the February 4 broadcast sounded much

better—though "Queen Mab" was not wholly satisfactory; and that he found the frequency range extended to about 7,500.

Since this has become a technical article I will end it with a couple of paragraphs for which I had no room in my last record-review. In the first place, I find it advisable to warn readers that recordings which were excellent when they were issued several years ago may be less good when they are bought today. I have already reported a loss of brightness in recent pressings of Columbia recordings of Mozart's Concerto K. 491 and Overture to "Don Giovanni"; a reader informs me that a copy of Columbia's recording of the Concerto K. 271 that he bought recently proved to be "useless"; and a few weeks ago I listened to a new copy of Victor's recording of the Concerto K. 482 and found it difficult to hear the music of the slow movement through the noises that accompanied it. I gather that in some instances the masters (or whatever it is the stampers are made from) have become defective; that in others it is unskilled or inefficient labor that has turned out defective pressings; and that it will probably be some time before replacements of the masters can be secured from Europe and the companies will again be operating with competent labor.

Also, good needles are hard to get nowadays. Apparently ordinary steel needles are no longer being manufactured; but they can still be found in out-of-the-way places, and are worth looking for, since a fresh steel needle for each record-side is still the best. If you must have a longer-playing needle—for example, for a record-changer—look for chromium-tipped needles, which are scarce but obtainable (the Columbia chromiums I used recently wore down much too quickly; I am trying out Victor now). The Rec-O-Ton and Victor Red Seal needles which the stores are well-stocked with give very poor reproduction and have other objectionable features; use them only as a last resort. "Permanent" needles, sapphire or metal, are a great temptation; but resist: my engineer friend, reading the money-back offer for the needle in one of the alluring advertisements, murmured: "And will they give you your money back for the damaged records?" And cactus and other thorn needles also should be avoided: they give very poor reproduction, and after repointing wear down very quickly and can damage a record as much as a worn steel needle.



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THE NATION

20 VESBY STREET, NEW YORK 7, N. Y.

Letters to the Editors

Rebuttal

Dear Sirs: Lee Morris's scathing rebuke, in your letter columns of January 13, to my analysis of the causes underlying the enactment of Florida's anti-closed-shop amendment does not discredit one word of my statement. His attack on the state's A. F. of L. unions is a colossal distortion. The very labor organizations so severely berated by Mr. Morris were almost solely responsible for the near defeat of the hateful amendment, despite the overwhelming support given it by the newspapers of the state, both urban and rural.

However unpleasant the idea may be to Mr. Morris, it is a clear, recognized, and easily ascertainable fact that the urban press of Florida is conservative, pro-business, and anti-labor. By no stretch of the imagination could the Ocala *Star-Banner* or the Miami *Daily News* be placed in the liberal fold. The perusal, issue by issue, of their editorial pages discloses that between October 1 and November 7 neither the Ocala *Star-Banner* nor the Miami *Daily News* opposed the anti-closed-shop amendment.

On the contrary, on October 23 the *Star-Banner* supported the proposal with an editorial whose Pegler-like conclusion was, "Whether the amendment carries or is defeated, it will serve as a warning to union labor to clean house, and doubtless some of the abuses which have given union labor a black eye can and will be corrected by statute at the next session of the legislature." In the same issue another colored editorial slashed at labor for striking for higher wages while soldiers are dying overseas. From October 1 until November 7, the crucial days of the election, the Miami *Daily News* did not carry a single editorial against the anti-closed-shop amendment.

Unfortunately, copies of the St. Petersburg *Independent* are not on file in the University of Florida library, but any intelligent Florida citizen would greet with nose-holding skepticism Mr. Morris's contention that the St. Petersburg *Independent* is as liberal and progressive as Nelson Poynter's St. Petersburg *Times*.

Mr. Morris calls "unfair" what he incorrectly terms my "condemnation" of

Florida's labor unions for tardy action against the anti-closed-shop amendment. He then breaches every code of fairness with the irresponsible and untrue charge that "the state A. F. of L. in Florida is thoroughly illiberal and racket-ridden and is more energetic in fighting democracy within its own organization than in any fight for principle." While boasting that his newspaper fought Franco, Mr. Morris forgets that the Tampa A. F. of L. cigarmakers' unions contributed so much to Loyalist Spain that Tampa is recognized as having done as much comparatively as any other city in the United States to uphold democracy in the Spanish Republic. Señor J. Alvarez del Vayo, Foreign Minister of Loyalist Spain, personally appeared in Tampa to thank our laboring people for their assistance.

After Florida's labor unions awakened to the danger that was upon them in the last election, they fought a good fight but lost. In the future they can win if they strike early and hard at their enemies. Is it wrong to try to help our state's young labor movement by exposing the dangers it must overcome? It may be proper for Mr. Morris to use the columns of *The Nation* to defend a newspaper in which he has a personal interest, but it is highly improper of him to make that defense a springboard for a leap at the throat of organized labor.

WILLIAM H. JOUBERT

Gainesville, Fla., January 23

Mr. Eliot and Mr. Hook

Dear Sirs: I read with interest in the issue of January 20 Sidney Hook's *The Dilemma of T. S. Eliot*, and if I understand it and Mr. Eliot's essay correctly, I wonder why a future "organic" world culture should depend either on a supernatural religious faith equipped with an ecclesiastical élite on a revamped medieval pattern, or on a purely secular belief in international economic planning, democracy, and the scientific method.

These last seem to me to be necessary means of accomplishing the desired end of a peaceful and fruitful world society, but are not in themselves, I think, capable of supplying their own motive power on a world scale.

That must come, as Mr. Eliot says, through a common religious faith whose values unify life. But this religious faith

must be all-inclusive, equally understandable by and equally significant to all peoples of whatever race or degree of cultural development. It must have no administrative élite or priestly class, selected on any basis whatever—only voluntary interpreters.

There may be an idea capable of such universal application in some religion with which I am not familiar; there is such a one, I believe, in the teachings of Jesus, namely, the Universal Fatherhood of God and the Universal Brotherhood of Man. This surely can be a common denominator of all religious beliefs. Special techniques are given for the individual expression of these beliefs in the two great Commandments: Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind; and Love thy neighbor as thyself.

The First Commandment gives complete freedom for individual interpretations of God; it allows scope for all kinds of intellectual theological structures, apparently necessary to some people; it satisfies the mystics, who in all ages, including our own, have felt a divine spirit "closer to them than breathing, nearer than hands and feet"; it releases a great motivating force, capable of achieving economic and political democracy by the scientific method, if the Second Commandment is interpreted in the largest social sense.

Who is to do the interpreting? I agree with Mr. Hook that the teacher, not the priest, will have most to do with strengthening and enriching a common faith, but the teacher must not overlook sources of spiritual power—and the teacher must be a prophet, not a hireling.

LOUISE W. GROVER


Gloversville, N. Y., January 24

Explanation

Dear Sirs: In the December 2, 1944, issue of *The Nation* appeared an article submitted by Overseas Press, Inc., entitled *Europe's Road to Peace*, by Dr. Jan Masaryk, which was supposed to represent the present views on international affairs of Dr. Masaryk, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister. The facts, however, are that the article had been written by Dr. Masaryk at the beginning of 1943, and obviously, inasmuch

Crossword Puzzle No. 103

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

- 1 "A duffle smart man" who was true to one party, and that was himself (*Biglow Papers*) (two words, 7 & 1)
 5 Tom's a/c brings good luck
 10 Where charity is practiced, and almost a nuttery
 11 The Ghost came between her and Hamlet
 12 Copper-hued maiden?
 13 Once given credit for increased corn production
 16 Building in which a cat would be proverbially jumpy
 17 Her name is proverbial for filial ingratitude
 19 She has letters for Alice
 20 Nationality of the first duellists
 22 Sustenance for the inner man
 23 The trouble, we find, with -----, is that you can't see where you're going
 25 Larve (anag.)
 27 Jeremy, Bayard and Zach
 31 It goes with hops
 32 Drinks that make you so sad
 33 It's a lot, but under a hundred it's reasonable
 36 Equivocation
 37 The "distressful isle"
 38 Might call it an illustrated book, since it's full of figures
 39 Just the fellow to give you a whale of a hiding

DOWN

- 1 Be off with you! (two words, 2 & 4)
 2 The one named opens with a negative
 3 Squared circle familiar to The Fancy

- 4 Suitable jar in which to keep electric eels?
 6 Each is present here
 7 Is always in the limelight
 8 Rat in gin (anag.)
 9 All the world loves one (especially the jeweler, the florist and the confectioner)
 13 Has been rather put out since the advent of electricity (two words, 4 and 3)
 14 The richest soil (two words, 3 and 4)
 15 Italians who start out with a character
 17 Gulliver became one in Lilliput
 18 Balts who sound willing
 21 "Paint me, warts and all," he said
 24 Jack Dempsey took the title from him
 26 A winker
 28 Offspring seems to declare you no good with brutal brevity
 29 "O, a fish? How idiotic!"
 30 Gave an invitation to another insect
 34 We wouldn't want to be taken for one
 35 She sounds comparatively thin

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 102

ACROSS:—1 MARTYRS; 5 ASHANTI; 9 REPURGE; 10 ANTONIO; 11 EBB; 13 LAUNCH; 15 IODINE; 16 KIPLING; 17 TREE; 19 EGGS; 20 TIT WILLOW; 21 FLEA; 23 EARP; 29 STARING; 31 RIDDLE; 32 GADGET; 36 ARA; 32 ENRAGED; 33 CHINESE; 34 SAYINGS; 35 SIGNS IT.
 DOWN:—1 MARPLOT; 2 RAPTURE; 3 YORICK; 4 SMER; 5 AHAB; 6 HOT DOG; 7 NANKING; 8 TRONERS; 12 BILLIARDS; 14 HITTITE; 15 INKLING; 18 ETA; 19 EWE; 21 FORGERS; 22 ELDERLY; 24 ALGIERS; 25 PATIENT; 26 SLOGAN; 27 GAZING; 28 ADDS; 31 ACTS.

as the political and military situation had changed in the meantime, the article misrepresented Dr. Masaryk's views on current developments as well as the Czechoslovak position.

The responsibility for publishing Dr. Masaryk's article was ours entirely. Through some negligence the Masaryk piece, which dealt with general questions of post-war reconstruction in Europe, got among our current manuscripts and was submitted to *The Nation* as a newly written story.

We sincerely regret any embarrassment which may have been caused to Dr. Masaryk, the Czechoslovak government, or *The Nation* by this unfortunate negligence on our part.

OVERSEAS PRESS, INC.

New York, January 31

Good News

Dear Sirs: Qualified Negro nurses are accepted by both the army and the navy. Any who wish to volunteer should write to the Army Nurse Corps or the Navy Nurse Corps, Washington, D. C., to avoid possible local opposition.

If any discrimination is encountered, notify Mrs. Mabelle K. Staupers, president of the National Association of Colored Graduate Nurses, 1790 Broadway, New York.

ETHEL CLYDE

New York, February 3

CONTRIBUTORS

MARGARET STEWART is labor editor of the *London Economist*.

ANDREE VIOLLIS is one of the eight French journalists now visiting this country at the invitation of the OWI. She represents *Le Soir*. During the occupation of France she wrote for the underground press.

EDGAR SNOW has been a newspaper and magazine correspondent in the Far East since 1929, most of the time in China. Among his books are "Far Eastern Front," "Red Star Over China," and "People on Our Side." He is also the author of a book in Chinese, "Impressions of the Northwest."

HORST MENDERSHAUSEN is a professor of political economy at Bennington College and author of "The Economics of War."

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